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[For information on the history of the distribution of peoples and political entities in Southeast Asia, and for the history of relations amongst the states of Southeast Asia and the relations between the French in Indochina and the states of Southeast Asia, see 115: Le Boulanger, AM1 , Indochina, category, 116. --Analyst]

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CHAPTER II

EARLY CHINESE CONTACTS WITH SOUTHEAST ASIA[1]

CHINA'S intercourse overland with the countries on her southern border is of a much greater order of antiquity than her contacts by sea. Her soldiers were in Tongking and Annam in the third century B.C.; thereafter they penetrated to Cambodia, then to Siam, the last-named being reached by sea. Here there was a halt for a considerable time before her navigators went on to Malaya, Sumatra, and Java. The process took many centuries, and for long intervals there is a complete lack of information regarding the Southeast Asian countries.[2] Merchants

[1] Much of our information regarding the earlier history of Southeast Asia is derived from Chinese sources, but we should in this chapter be on our guard against identifying Chinese *knowledge* of the region with Chinese *contacts* with it. No doubt, of course, some of the information was obtained from Chinese who had actually visited the countries of the region, but much also was at second-hand and, at that, recorded often a considerable period after the time to which it relates.

In recent years a great deal has been added to our knowledge by the researches of orientalists and archaeologists, but these additions have often been independent and disassociated from one another, and the problem of the identification of geographical names has meant that places—often whole countries—have moved their location all over the map as learned discussion has displaced or refixed them. There has for long been a crying need to systematize the existing knowledge of Southeast Asia and to give more certainty and coherence to the early history, and this is what Sir Roland Braddell has been attempting to do since 1935 in his series of studies on 'Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula' in the *Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society*. ('An Introduction to the Study of Ancient Times in the Malay Peninsula and the Straits of Malacca, continued as Notes on Ancient Times in Malaya'; *JRASMB*, vol. xiii, pt. 2, vol. xiv, pt. 3, vol. xv, pt. 3, vol. xvii, pt. 1, vol. xix, pt. 1.) Our concern is not directly with the subject of these inquiries, but we shall keep these studies closely in mind when outlining Chinese contacts with the southeastern areas of the Asiatic continent. What we shall have to say will often be in repetition or in summary of the remarks made in the separate country studies, but this is with the intention of giving the reader at the outset a glance over the entire area.

[2] This seems to be true as a generalization, though the *Han Shu*, vol. xxviii, speaks of voyages in the Han dynasty to Jihnan and Hsüwenhopu taking five months, to Touyüankuo taking four months, and to Ilumeikuo taking about twenty days. See Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang) p. 1 (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937). (The place-names are here given in mandarin, but the foreign investigator who endeavours to identify ancient Chinese place-names in Southeast Asia would be well advised first to give the characters their phonetic equivalents in ancient

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from the West passed across Central Asia into China in the Han and later dynasties by routes that skirted the northern and southern slopes of the Tarim river basin, but they also came into the empire by way of the south, up the rivers of what is now Burma and across the hills into the present Yunnan, and by the longer sea route to the south coast. As early as the second century B.C. there appear to have been Chinese trade routes through Yunnan to the Irrawaddy and Salween valleys. For a time the main port in the south was in the future Tongking, and it was not until later centuries that it was supplanted by Canton. It was to Loyang that in A.D. 166 came an embassy of Westerners claiming to be sent by their King, who is supposed to have been the Roman Emperor Marcus Aurelius Antoninus (An-tun).[1]

Our earliest and surest information is of the Chinese intercourse with the countries sharing a land frontier with China on the south-west, and first of all in point of time comes Annam.

During the Han dynasty there existed a kingdom known as Nan-Yüeh (Nam-Viet) which extended from the region of Canton far into the Indo-Chinese peninsula to the present central Annam.[2] In 111 B.C. this kingdom was conquered by the Chinese and was divided into nine districts, one of which, Chiuchen (Annamese Cu'uchan), corresponds roughly to the present province of Thanh-hoa in northern Annam.[3] It is likely that Chinese suzerainty ex-

Chinese according to Karlgren's *Analytical Dictionary of Sino-Japanese* (Paris, 1923).

[1] See Kenneth Scott Latourette, *The Chinese: their History and Culture*, 3rd ed. (New York, Macmillan, 1946) p. 123.

Among the recent finds at Go Oc Eo was a gold medal bearing an image of Antoninus Pius with a date which corresponds to A.D. 152, showing that at an early date Funan (the ancient State in southern Annam) had connexions, direct or indirect, with the western Mediterranean. See G. Coedès, *Les états hindouisés d'Indochine et d'Indonésie* (Paris, E. de Boccard, 1948) pp. 38–9, 89.

[2] The recently published work of Professor Olov R. T. Janse, *Archaeological Research in Indo-China* (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1947), greatly extends our existing knowledge of the Chinese remains in the region. Professor Janse's historical summary is here followed.

[3] Édouard Chavannes, trans., *Les Mémoires Historiques de Se-Ma T'sien* (Paris, Laroux, 1895–1905) i. 87 and ii. 168, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi. And Léonard Aurousseau, 'La Première Conquête des Pays Annamites', *BEFEO*, vol. xxii, pp. 137–264, and vol. xiv, pp. 9, 13. Cited by Janse at same place.

Wang Wen-yuan (op. cit. p. 4), citing Wang Ton-lin, *Histoire du Peuple Chinois* (in Chinese), and H. Maspero, 'Étude d'Histoire d'Annam, III, Commanderie de Siang', *BEFEO*, vol. iii (Hanoi, 1918) pp. 11–28, gives a somewhat different account of this early period. He says that in the year 214 B.C. the first Emperor of the Chin dynasty, Shih Huangti, sent 500,000 Chinese—soldiers,

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tended even farther south, though in an indefinite way. However, to date there has been no archaeological evidence of any Chinese settlement of the Han dynasty farther south than a spot immediately below Thanhhoa in the provinces of Nghean and Hatinh.

After the native chief of Chiuchen had yielded to the Chinese without putting up any resistance, he was retained in his position with the title of T'aishou.[1]

The new masters of the southern territory, the 'Sons of Han' as they called themselves, ruled at first with moderation, allowing to the natives a considerable degree of freedom, but about the beginning of the Christian era they adopted a sterner attitude. At least this was so in the case of Tongking where, according to Chinese records, the Emperor Hsi Kuang (A.D. 1–25)[2] 'transformed the people through the rites and by justice', and it is most probable that the Chinese attitude towards the natives of Chiuchen was the same. It was this heavier hand of alien government, aiming at securing the rapid sinicization of the subdued barbarians, which no doubt aroused the spirit of resistance, for in A.D. 40 Cheng-Tse (Tr'ung-Trac in Annamese), the daughter of a native chief of Tongking from Mileng (Annamese, Milinh), stirred up a rebellion which succeeded temporarily in driving out the Chinese, and the native chiefs of Chiuchen joined in the struggle.

In the present state of knowledge it is impossible to establish with precision the dates of the earlier Chinese settlements in Chiuchen, but Professor Janse thinks it very likely that some pioneers ventured to immigrate thither in the third century B.C., and this is the time when the Chinese began to infiltrate into northern Indochina, especially Tongking. In any case there must have been a considerable intercourse between southern China and Thanhhoa at the end of the third or at least at the beginning of the second century B.C. To a certain extent this supposition can be corroborated by archaeology (e.g. from examples in the 'Huai Valley' style).

peasants, and those condemned to banishment, to take possession of Nam-Viet 'the land beyond the southern border'. After the conquest the country was divided into three commands, that of Nanhai, corresponding probably to the present province of Kwangtung, that of Kweilin in the present-day Kwangsi, and that of Shiang in Tongking and north Annam. These (says Wang Wen-yuan) marked the foundation of the first important Chinese colony in Indochina.

[1] H. Maspero, *BEFEO*, vol. xxxvii, pp. 263, 264, note 5, cited by Janse, loc. cit.

[2] H. A. Giles lists seven Emperors from A.D. 1 to 25, but not this one.

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177 Professor Janse makes the following interesting observations on the period:[1]
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It can be assumed that the first Chinese who ventured into the country and mingled with the natives were journeying merchants or artisans. Even to-day Chinese peddlers are highly regarded among the natives because of their skill in commerce and craftsmanship. As they are generally fairly well-to-do, they are much sought after by the families of the aboriginal chieftains. Thus many of these modern settlers bring with them into Tongking and Northern Annam Chinese crafts and customs. What is happening to-day in this respect has certainly been going on not merely for centuries but for millenia. . . . In the wake of these tradesmen certainly came the civil and military mandarins, accompanied by the less welcome tax-collector, and by political refugees.

At this early time (Henri Maspero points out) the entire territory was covered with marshes and forests in which elephants, rhinoceroses, and tigers abounded and in which the aboriginals lived by hunting and fishing, eating pythons and wild beasts killed by their bone-tipped arrows. To this diet they added small crops from their primitive rice-fields which they prepared by burning down a part of the forest before the rainy season, without cultivating or irrigating the area. Only around the centres of administration, under the influence of the Chinese governors, especially the prefect Jen Yen, had they begun to till the soil in the manner of the Chinese.[2]

Such was the land which the Chinese called the 'Kingdom of the Naked'. It was not until after the victorious campaign of Ma Yuan at the beginning of the Christian era that the Chinese settled on any large scale. Archaeological evidence of this is to be found on the brick tombs of the later Han discovered in Thanhhoa. Among the most fascinating funerary objects unearthed by Dr. Janse are models of farm-houses or, in some cases, probably manor-houses, consisting of quadrangular yards surrounded by walls and a variety of buildings. Some are even provided with furniture, such as ovens, troughs, &c. They give an excellent picture of early Chinese settlements in Annam.

It will be convenient here to discontinue the outline of Sino-Annamese contacts and to resume it in the part of this survey dealing with Indochina, turning our attention to the question of the antiquity of Chinese intercourse with Malaysia far away to the

[1] op. cit. p. xvi.
[2] H. Maspero, op. cit. p. 12, cited by Janse, op. cit. p. xvi.

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south. According to the consensus of opinion, the date of the first Chinese association with these regions goes back to the third and even fourth centuries B.C. Dr Heine-Geldern in 1934 pointed out the stylistic similarities between some of the prehistoric stone sculptures of the Pasemah region in southern Sumatra and those standing at the tomb of the Chinese general Huo K'iu-ping in Shensi province in China, erected in 117 B.C. This, he says, seemed to indicate more or less intimate contacts with China, to be dated probably in the second and first centuries B.C. A decade later the same authority again referred to his own statement and pointed out that since then Chinese objects of the Han dynasty had actually been found in Indonesia. Moreover, a considerable number of Chinese sepulchral pottery vessels of the Han period had been excavated in Sumatra, Java, and Borneo, and one of them, from Sumatra, bore an inscription dating it 45 B.C.[1] From these finds, De Flines inferred, no doubt correctly, that Chinese colonists or merchants must have lived in Indonesia as early as the Han period. Also from Sumatra comes a bowl engraved with designs of persons in Chinese dresses and of horses in Han style, and other pieces of evidence included a Chinese bronze dagger-axe (*ko*) which was said to have come from Sumatra, and another from Java.

Taking all into account [Dr Heine-Geldern writes] one may come to the conclusion that direct Chinese influence in Indonesia goes back at least to the early Han period, that is at the very latest to the 1st century B.C. However, the ornamental designs of the Dyak tribes of Borneo and of the Ngada of Flores are so clearly related to Chinese designs of the late Chou period that one can hardly avoid the inference that Chinese contacts started as early as the beginning of the third century B.C., and probably earlier.

The investigation of this very early period of intercourse is almost exclusively a monopoly of the archaeologist and of the anthropologist, and what conclusions are to be drawn from the finds must remain a matter of some delicacy to the non-expert in these fields. Nevertheless it is important to note the difference of opinion between some of the schools of thought concerning the degree of Chinese influence on the regions of Southeast Asia. Speaking of

[1] R. Heine-Geldern, *Prehistoric Research in the Netherlands Indies* (New York, Southeast Asia Institute, 1945) p. 147. See also the same author, *The Archaeology and Art of Sumatra.*

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the intercourse of a much later period, the second Sung dynasty onwards, Fay Cooper Cole remarks:

> These early contacts were primarily for trade and, while they did help to shape the history of Malaysia, they seldom were intimate enough to introduce Chinese methods, such as the potter's wheel; few Chinese words entered the language; and the influence of their political and religious ideas was nil.[1]

To this we may object that Chinese methods of agriculture, at least, through these same contacts had a profound effect on the economy of the Southeast Asian countries. None the less, Hindu influence upon Southeast Asia has been culturally much more important than Chinese, and in the sphere of navigation in the first centuries of the Christian era it was the Arabs, the Indians, and the Persians who made their way to China and the Chinese who, generally speaking, stayed at home. There was a colony of Arabs in Sumatra at a very early date, and they had a counting-house at Canton as early as A.D. 300.[2]

Latourette says that 'Chinese merchants seem not to have ventured very far afield, and to have left chiefly to strangers the initiative in foreign trade, but outsiders found China a profitable country with which to deal'. Lack of enterprise is also attributed to the Chinese by Groeneveldt, the pioneer writer on Chinese intercourse with Southeast Asia, who remarks:

> A careful perusal of the geographical literature of the ancient Chinese has shown that they have not gained their knowledge of Southeastern Asia by bold voyages of discovery: slowly and cautiously they have crept along its shores, probably not venturing to a country before they have become acquainted with it through others.[3]

And Kuwabara (cited by Braddell) says, 'the Chinese trading ships before the T'ang era were inferior in all respects to those of the South Sea countries'. Although it must be conceded that the Chinese were behind the Middle Eastern races in enterprise or curiosity, the remarks of Groeneveldt apply in a measure to all other peoples who have come into Southeast Asia. Were their

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, *The Peoples of Malaysia* (New York, Van Nosstrand, 1945) p. 27.

[2] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xx, pt. 2 (1947) p. 8.

[3] W. P. Groeneveldt, *Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca; Miscellaneous papers relating to the Indian Archipelago* (London, Trübner, 1887) i. 126–262.

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explorations of the coasts of Borneo (asks Mr Tom Harrisson) any slower or more cautious than those of the Portuguese? On the contrary there is every indication that there was a regular trade on a mass scale for centuries back. Certainly by the fourth and fifth centuries Chinese ships were feeling their way along the coasts and over the seas to meet the Arabs, Persians, and Indians part way.

The reason for Chinese comparative dilatoriness in utilizing the sea routes on their own account may have been their sense of national sufficiency, and the feeling that they had nothing of great value to obtain from the regions of the south, but none the less their influence spread out over the land routes through the agency of the Arab and Indian traders. 'It is clear that at the time when the European barbarians of the north were conquering Rome, a southward movement in the Far East was taking place—the flow of the cultured Chinese into Malay lands, and the spread of Chinese civilization in Malaysia.'[1] At the same time the main colonizing activity was by Indians. Individual Chinese pilgrims and travellers, such as the Buddhist monk, Fa Hsien (or Fa Hien), went overland to India, visited Ceylon by sea, and arrived in what was either Java or Malaya in A.D. 413, and I-tsing, much later, in A.D. 692, reached Lang-ya-si, identified as Langkasuka, a kingdom in the Malay peninsula. Fa Hsien found no Chinese in Java or Malaya (whichever it may have been), though his eyes filled with tears, he tells us, at the sight of a Chinese taffeta fan, for he had been away from home for thirteen years.[2]

It is not perhaps remarkable that the Chinese of the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries left most of the colonizing initiative to others, for, quite apart from their self-sufficiency, these were the Dark Ages of Chinese history when warfare and foreign invasion were almost incessant. Nevertheless, in the first Sung dynasty (A.D. 420–

[1] G. Nye Steiger, H. Otley Beyer, and Conrado Benitez, *A History of the Orient* (Boston, Ginn & Co., 1926) p. 202 and passim.

[2] *Fa Hsien Fo Kuo Chi*, the record of Fa Hsien's voyages, has been translated by Samuel Beal as 'An Account of the Buddhist Countries' (London, Trübner, 1869), by J. Legge (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1866), and re-translated by H. A. Giles (Cambridge University Press, 1923). Rémusat's French translation is earlier (1836).

Giles gives the track of the voyage of Fa Hsien from Ceylon to China as being via the Straits of Sunda, whereas W. A. Grimes (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941)), a meteorologist, basing his views on a study of the winds near the equator, considers that he went via the Straits of Malacca. This is also the view of Braddell, who thinks that Fa Hsien's *Ye-po-ti* was not Java but Malaya. (*JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1947) p. 25.)

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177 175 79) missions from these southeastern countries made their appearance in China, and after the Liang dynasty (A.D. 502–57) envoys came from over the sea every year for the purpose of getting an almanac and of acquitting themselves of the duty of tribute in greater number than in any former time.[1]

Reference in Chinese history to countries and places in these territories does not necessarily mean that they were known to the Chinese by direct contact. An early voyage, however, was in A.D. 607 when the Emperor Sui Yang-ti sent a mission by sea to Siam to open up commercial relations with that country.[2] But the sprinkling of references to places, probably in this Southeast Asian area, of obscure identity which may be found in the History of the Liang Dynasty (502–57) is succeeded in the History of the T'ang Dynasty (618–907) by information regarding definite countries which has a much surer feel. For example, we hear (and believe) that between 756 and 779 three envoys of Java arrived in China and that in the year 813 further envoys arrived at the capital with presents of four negro slaves, parrots of different colours, pinka-birds (not identified), and other gay trifles. The Emperor honoured the envoy with the title of Left Defender of the Office of the Four Inner Gates, and when the recipient wanted to waive the title in favour of his younger brother, the Emperor praised him for his unselfishness and bestowed a title on both of them.[3]

We are now definitely in the era of the tribute-bearing missions which soon took on the character of trading expeditions since the Emperor invariably presented to the envoys gifts equal to or greater in value than those they had brought. The missions were very numerous and a mere recital of them would not add much to our enlightenment. They had always, of course, a purely diplomatic appearance, especially those sent on the accession of a new Emperor or a new dynasty.

Between 1209 and 1214 a book was written by Chao Ju-kua, a member of the imperial family of the Sung dynasty (960–1280) and superintendent and commissioner of Customs at Ch'üanchowfu, a coast town to the north of Amoy. This book, based on information

[1] Braddell, op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (1941) p. 21.

[2] *Chau [sic] Ju-kua* (late Sung Dynasty): *His work on the Chinese and Arab trade in the Twelfth and Thirteenth Centuries*, translated from the Chinese and annotated by Friedrich Hirth and W. W. Rockhill (St. Petersburg, Academy of Science, 1911) p. 8. The name of the work in Chinese is *Chu Fan Chi*.

[3] *T'ang History*, Book 222, Part 2, Groeneveldt, p. 140.

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gained from merchants from India, Persia, Syria, and Arabia, gives facts concerning the countries and peoples of the West, including Spain, and of the Chinese trade with the Malaysian islands. (Some details from this work are cited both above and later in this chapter.)

In the History of the Sung Dynasty we have a detailed account of Java, including the observation: 'Their houses are handsome and are adorned with yellow and green tiles: when Chinese merchants arrive they are received as guests in a public building and what they eat and drink is copious and clean.'[1]

In 1291 Angkor was visited by Marco Polo and the Lady Kutai, whom the Mongol Emperor of China was sending as a bride for the Khan of Persia, there to behold the fast-fading glories of the Khmer empire.[2] Five years later, one Chou Ta-kwan was a member of the Chinese mission sent to acquaint the King of Cambodia with the accession of Yüan Cheng, the new Emperor of China and grandson and successor of Kublai Khan. To this same Chou Ta-kwan we owe a vivid and detailed account of the Khmer empire.[3] What concerns us here, however, is his remarks concerning his own countrymen who visited or were resident in Cambodia. Here are some of them rendered into English from Pelliot's translation.

The Chinese who follow the sea as a profession take advantage of their being in this country to dispense with wearing clothes. Rice is easy to obtain, women are easy to find, the houses are easy to run, personal property is easy to come by, commerce is easy to engage in. Thus there are constantly those who direct themselves towards this country.

In this country it is the women who are skilful in commerce. Thus a Chinese who arrives down there and take a wife profits in addition by her commercial aptitude.

This Chinese chronicler (says Mr Brodrick), with the typical prejudice of his people against frequent washing, wrote that, 'the people are often ill, owing to their too frequent baths and the incessant wasting of the heat'.

According to Chou Ta-kwan, the embassy to Cambodia in 1296 was entirely successful and homage was rendered to China, but (says Pelliot) '*peut être est-il trop intéressé dans l'affaire pour que nous accordions pleine créance à ses dires. En fait il n'y a aucune trace que des relations officielles régulières aient suivi la mission de 1296*'.

[1] Book 489. Groeneveldt, p. 141.
[2] A. H. Brodrick, *Little Vehicle* (London, Hutchinson, n.d. (1949?)) p. 156.
[3] 'Tcheou-Ta-Kouan, Mémoires sur les coutumes de Cambodge' (trans. by Paul Pelliot), *BEFEO*, vol. ii, no. 2 (1902).

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177 There is certainly no mention of Cambodia in the History of the
175 Yüan Dynasty.

It is first in the Yüan dynasty (A.D. 1280–1368) that action combines with colour to make real the machinations of Chinese imperial politics in these waters. In the year 1292 the Emperor Kubla Khan, no doubt envious of the growing influence of Java in further India and the eastern part of the archipelago, sent an expedition against the Javanese State of Singosari. He ordered the Governor of Fukien to send Shih Pi, Ike Mese, and Hau Hsing to collect from Kiangsi and Kiukiang soldiers to the number of 20,000 who were to be embarked in a thousand ships for the Southern Ocean. Shih Pi sailed with 5,000 men from Ch'üanchow, probably via the Paracel Islands, Macclesfield Bank (to give them their modern names), Annam (Giau-chi), and Champa, encountering bad weather on the way, and in the first moon of the following year they passed the Natuna Islands to a place which was probably Billiton in Java where the fleet stopped to cut timber to make small boats suitable for going up the rivers. An internal feud was in progress between native potentates and in this Shih Pi took sides, routing the army of Daha (Kediri).[1]

But Shih Pi lost 3,000 of his men (largely, it seems, through sickness) and for this he was disgraced and ordered to receive seventeen strokes. But in 1295 he was restored to favour, and he died, high in honours, at the age of eighty-six.

The Ming History records that at this time Java was subdued,[2] but the truth is that the great expedition had failed and no new one was undertaken. The military expeditions of the Mongols had nowhere more than a temporary influence.

The empire of Sri Vijaya, which endured for many centuries, had its capital in Sumatra in the neighbourhood of Palembang. It included the Malay Peninsula under its sway. Eventually it decayed under Chola (Coromandel) raids, the revolt of Melayu (Jambi), and attacks from neighbouring kingdoms. The Sung chronicles have many references to Sri Vijaya's wars. The empire eventually disappeared and was succeeded by Jambi. Jambi in turn (between

[1] For an account of the complex politics and strategy of this expedition see E. S. de Klerck, *History of the Netherlands Indies* (Rotterdam, W. L. & J. Brusse, 1938) i. 139–40.

[2] Book 324. It appears from Chinese records and the account of Marco Polo that Tuban, Sedayu, and Tjanggu were at that time prosperous commercial towns. De Klerck, op. cit. p. 140.

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1338 and 1365) succumbed to Majapahit, whose seat of government was in Java. Majapahit was warlike and destructive: it sacked ports in Borneo, Surabaya, Ceram, and Lombok, and finally subjected Sri Vijaya's colonies in the Malay Peninsula.[1]

Palembang, near the east coast of Sumatra, fell into Chinese hands on the decay of Sri Vijaya and remained under them for about two hundred years. The Chinese who lived there followed piracy as a calling, using the port as a retreat and strongpoint. This town, then, was one of the earliest places in Southeast Asia where the Chinese settled in any numbers. San-fo-ts'i is a rival for the distinction (if, indeed, it were a Malayan territory distinct from Sri Vijaya), and when it faded in importance about the same time as Sri Vijaya, several thousand Chinese from Fukien and Canton who lived there began to govern themselves. In 1377 they had as their leader a man named Liang Tau-ming from Namhoi in Kwangtung.

Meanwhile, in 1349, Wang Ta-yuan, a Chinese merchant, writes of Tumasik, or Old Singapore.[2] His account gives the very definite impression that here also was a fairly large settlement of Chinese. This is the first colony of Chinese in the Malay Peninsula of which we have any record.

In a later chapter in the history of the Chinese in Malaya we shall discuss the question whether the Chinese formed any permanent settlement in the Malay kingdom of Malacca, which was founded about A.D. 1400 and endured until the Portuguese conquest of 1511. The chances are (we shall decide) that the merchants who visited the place were merely seasonal visitors, coming down from China with one monsoon and going back with the other. But it was in the early years of the Malay kingdom that the Emperors of the Ming dynasty began to send expeditions to the Southern Ocean and beyond on a grand scale.[3]

In 1403, says the Ming History,[4] the Emperor sent the eunuch

[1] See Sir Richard Winstedt, *Malaya and its History* (London, Hutchinson, 1948) p. 29 ff.

There are maps showing the probable extent of Sri Vijaya and Majapahit accompanying H. Otley Beyer, 'The Philippines before Magellan', *Asia*, vol. xxi (1921).

[2] See p. 282.

[3] In summarizing the Ming voyages the writer has to be much on his guard. The facts and translations of the authorities of last century, particularly Rockhill, have been subjected to the searching scrutiny of Professor Duyvendak, and many errors and slips have been revealed.

[4] J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'The true dates of the Chinese Maritime Expeditions in the early fifteenth century', *T'oung Pao*, xxxiv (Leyden, 1939).

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Yin Ch'ing as envoy to Malacca with presents of silk brocade.[1] But more noteworthy was the visit a few years afterwards by the famous Grand Eunuch, Cheng Ho, later deified as Sam-po-kung.

Altogether Cheng Ho and his colleagues, the Grand Eunuch Wang Chin, and the assistant envoys, the Grand Eunuchs Hung Pao and Yung Chen, together with the Senior Lesser Eunuch Chang Ta, commanding the fleet, made seven voyages, in 1405, 1407, 1409, 1414, 1417, 1421, and 1431 (these being the years in which the expeditions set out).[2] The account published by them in 1431 is in their collective name, but it is not clear which of them took part in the several voyages. The following is abstracted from their account as quoted by Professor Duyvendak:

Voyage I

In the third year of Yung Lo (1405), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Ku-li (Calicut) and other countries. At that time the pirate Ch'en Tsu-yi and his followers were assembled at San-fo-ts'i (Palembang) where they plundered the native merchants. We captured the leader alive and returned in the fifth year (1407).

Voyage II

In the fifth year of Yung Lo (1407), 'commanding the fleet', we went to Kua-Wa (Java), Ku-li (Calicut), Ko-chih (Cochin), and Hsien-lo (Siam). The kings of these countries all presented us as tribute with local products, precious birds, and (rare) animals. We returned in the seventh year (1409).

Voyage III

In the seventh year of Yung Lo (1409), 'commanding the fleet', we went to the countries visited before and took our route by the country of Hsi-lan-shan (Ceylon). Its King Ya-lieh-jo-nai-erh (Alagakkonara) was guilty of a gross lack of respect and plotted against the fleet. Owing to the manifest answer (to prayer) of the divine power (the plot) was discovered and thereupon the king was captured alive. In the ninth year (1411), on our return, he was presented (to the throne as a prisoner). Subsequently he received the imperial favour of returning to his own country.

[1] Ming History, Book 325.

[2] 'What are today called the Indian Ocean or the Nanyang were formerly called the Nan Hai (Southern Sea) or the Nan-hsi Hai (Southwestern Sea). The sea to the south of the Gulf of Siam was given the special name of Ch'ang Hai.' Feng Ch'eng-chün, *Nan Yang Chiao T'ung Shih* (*History of Chinese Relations with the Nanyang*) (Shanghai, Commercial Press, 1937) p. 91.

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The fourth voyage (1414) was to Ormuz and other places and the fleet returned in 1415. In that year the king of the country of Man-la-Chia (Malacca) came in person with his wife and son to present tribute. On the fifth voyage (1417–19) the envoys visited Ormuz again and also Aden, Mogadisho, Calicut, &c., bringing back zebras, lions, camels, and ostriches. Ormuz figured once more in the sixth voyage (1421–2) and in the sixth year of Hsüan-ti (1431), 'starting once more for the barbarian (countries) in order to make known the imperial commands', the fleet sailed for the Western Ocean, returning in 1433.

The object of the voyages was to enhance the prestige of the Ming dynasty and, incidentally, to keep a look out for any rebels against the dynasty who might have taken refuge in the Nanyang. 'The Imperial Ming dynasty', proclaimed the high envoys, 'in unifying seas and continents, surpasses the Three Dynasties and even goes beyond the Han and the T'ang. The countries beyond the horizon and from the ends of the earth have all become subjects (of the Imperial Ming). . . . The barbarians from beyond the seas . . ., have come to audience bearing precious objects and presents.'

Says Professor Duyvendak in another place:[1]

> These embassies must have been stupendous undertakings; fleets are described of 62 vessels carrying 37,000 soldiers; more than 20 countries in the Indian archipelago and the Indian Ocean were visited; chiefs and kings, like those of Palembang and of Ceylon, were deposed and sent as captives to China, and members of the expeditions went as far as Aden and Mecca, bringing messages from the Chinese court. Most surprising of all, these fleets were commanded by eunuchs, of whom none is more famous than Cheng Ho, known as San-Pao-T'ai-Ch'ien.

The dynastic histories have a good deal to say of Java during the period of Cheng Ho's voyages. The denizens of the country were divided into three kinds of people—first, the Chinese who resided there temporarily and whose clothes and food were fine and nice; secondly, the traders from other countries, who resided there for a longer time, and who also were quite civilized and clean; and thirdly, the natives of the country, who were very dirty and were fond of eating snakes, insects, and worms, and who slept and ate together with the dogs. From Grissé, in 1411, a Chinese from Canton sent representatives to the Chinese court and a letter offer-

[1] 'Ma Huan Re-examined', *Proceedings of the Royal Academy of Science* (Amsterdam, 1933). (On the *Ying yai sheng lan*, ascribed to Ma Huan.)

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ing produce of the country as tribute. Tuban was the native name of a place near Grissé where more than a thousand families lived, all under one chief. Amongst them were many Chinese from Canton and Changchow (near Amoy) who were settled there. Fowls, goats, fish, and vegetables were cheap there. Surabaya was another place where there were many Chinese. Later it seems that Tuban was deserted by them because of its insecurity (there being numerous robbers) and all trade went to a new place, Yortan (situated in the present district of Paduran), but it subsequently disappeared.

There is in the Chinese records a large number of references to the Chinese in Java and Sumatra in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries on the eve of the European incursions into these waters. Many pirates are mentioned, including Ch'en Tsu-yi who was seized by Cheng Ho. Later on, in the reign of Chia Ching (1522–66), another notorious Cantonese robber flourished. Besides his main business of robbery, he had a large commercial establishment in which many Hokkiens were employed.

Regarding the Chinese navigation of these seas, it has been remarked that their junks always sailed with the trade winds, going with the northeast monsoon and returning home with the southwest monsoon. On the outward voyage it was the custom to follow the Asiatic coast, but on the home trip the ships of Amoy probably sailed along the west coasts of Borneo, Palawan, Luzon, and Formosa. Moreover, the sailing directions in Chinese books indicate that ships bound for the Sulu Archipelago, eastern Borneo, and, in later centuries, even for Banjermassin and Java, first crossed over to the island of Luzon and sailed southwards through the Philippines.[1]

This opinion is consistent with that of Sir Roland Braddell who says:

> Summarizing, we suggest that both *a priori* reasoning and such data as we possess lead to a very early knowledge of Borneo on the part of the Indians and Chinese and that in the case of both of them probably, but the latter certainly, they must have been familiar with Borneo before they became familiar with Java, the navigation to which was far more difficult and more dangerous.[2]

[1] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. pp. 202, 203. See also p. 679 of this Survey, and the remarks on Chinese navigation of Southeast Asian waters in J. V. Mills, 'Malaya in the Wu-pei-chih Charts', *JRASMB*, vol. xv, pt. 3 (December 1937).

[2] op. cit. *JRASMB*, vol. xix, pt. 1 (February 1941) p. 72.

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Let us now go back for a while and consider the early history of the Chinese contacts with Borneo in more detail, keeping in mind the implications raised by Dr Heine-Geldern's revelations of the finds there and in Indonesia.

The credit for bringing Brunei to the official notice of China seems to have been due to neither the Chinese nor the Borneans, but rather to the enterprising Arab traders of Canton and Ch'üan-chow. It is not known just how early these Arabs began trading in Brunei, but in 977 a certain Abu Ali and two other Arabs came to the Chinese court as envoys from the king of Brunei. From the twelfth to the fifteenth century accounts of Brunei, Sulu, Mindoro, and others of the Philippine Islands became more numerous. Before 1225 Chinese vessels were making trading trips to nearly all parts of the Philippines. Apart from Sulu, which had always maintained closer relations with Borneo than with the Philippines, the most important trade centre appears to have been Mindoro.[1]

The traditions of Borneo and Sulu indicate that a Chinese province was established some centuries ago in the neighbourhood of the Kinabatangan River, and the province had dominion over the Sulu River. It is mainly accepted, too, that a daughter of a Chinese 'prince', who was in all probability the governor of the province referred to, came from the Kinabatangan River to marry the second sultan of Brunei, and from that couple originated the royal family of Brunei of the present day.

The statement that the Dusuns are 'half-Chinese' is frequently made by residents of Borneo. This theory has led to much controversy. In the middle of the last century a traveller in Sarawak, a Mr Witti, expressed himself strongly against any supposed Chinese mixture in the blood of the Dusuns, saying, 'I think no Chinese colonies ever existed in the north of Borneo', but the same traveller in a journey up the Pagalan River speaks of a tribe that was 'probably the result of an infusion of Chinese blood with the aboriginal races of Borneo'.[2] Regarding the Dyaks, Earl remarks that the Chinese of his time supposed them to be descended from a large body of their countrymen left by accident on the island, but this belief, he says, was entertained solely on the basis of the Chinese legend of the Kuni Balu snake whose stone was stolen by the

[1] Steiger, Otley Beyer, Benitez, op. cit. p. 205.
[2] Cited by Ling Roth, *The Natives of Sarawak and British North Borneo* (London, Truslove & Hanson, 1896) i. 24.

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Emperor of China by the agency of Chinese who formed a chain from the snake's lair to waiting junks. The stone was recovered by the snake, but the human chain of Chinese remained to colonize the country. Another legend of this nature concerned the origin of the Bolupih race from a Chinese native union. C. A. de Crespigny could see no similarity between the natives and the Chinese except a turning-in of the upper eyelid in childhood, whereas St John observed that the 'features of many are very like the Chinese—perhaps a trace of that ancient kingdom that tradition fixes in this neighbourhood'.[1] In the present century I. H. N. Evans has pronounced strongly against the theory of Chinese admixture with the Dusuns though he admits Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River.[2]

But whatever the truth regarding the Chinese colonization of Borneo in remoter times, it is certain that by the early nineteenth century a considerable admixture of the races was in progress. Intermarriage between Chinese men and Dyak women was common and St John, at the request of the Raja, opened a school for the benefit of the offspring of such unions.

Truly speaking (St John adds) the Chinese women up here are themselves the offspring of mixed marriages, but having been brought up in all the manners and customs of the Chinese, are looked upon as Chinese. The settled agricultural tribes between the Brunei and Murudu Rivers were considered good examples of Chinese and natives intermarrying.

Of special interest to the students of Chinese contacts with Borneo is the evidence afforded by native agricultural methods and the 'sacred jars'.

Sir Spenser St John describes the methods used by the native

[1] Ling Roth, op. cit. i. 57; ibid. p. 59.

[2] I. H. N. Evans, *Among Primitive Peoples in Borneo* (London, Seeley Service, 1932) p. 274 ff.

Mr Tom Harrisson comments: 'How is it possible to conclude that the theory is not true, while at the same time admit Chinese admixtures on the Klias Peninsula and the Kinabatangan River? Such traditions do not persist unless there is some reason for them. In fact, they are to be found in some form or other, over a much wider area of Borneo, and were recorded by some of the very earliest travellers, such as the anonymous writer in the *Chinese Repository* of 1834, and Earl in 1837. The most that can be said is that the matter is not proven either way. . . . St John in 1858 found remains of extensive pepper gardens in the Madihit, ten days by canoe, through rapids etc., right up the Limbang and right in the interior. The oldest Muruts could then just remember these Chinese. The present inhabitants of the area have *no idea* there were ever Chinese there—a good example of the negative negative.'

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people of Tumposok where he first saw natives ploughing. The plough was of a very simple construction, serving rather to scratch the ground than to turn it over, was entirely of wood, and was drawn by a buffalo, and its action was the same as if a pointed stick had been dragged through the land to a depth of about four inches. After ploughing, they used a rough kind of harrow. 'I think this superior agriculture', says St John, 'is obviously a remnant of Chinese civilization.'[1]

Tangible evidence of Chinese contact with Sarawak is afforded by the 'sacred jars', undoubtedly of Chinese origin. The 'jar cult' played an important role not only in Borneo but also among the Moi of southern Indochina, in the Philippines, in Formosa, and various other parts of the Indonesian region. (Dr Heine-Geldern remarks that Professor Janse's recent discoveries in Indochina may help to solve the origin of this cult.) St John describes the several kinds of jars existing in Sarawak. The best known were the Gusi, the Rusa, and the Naga. The most valuable, the Gusi, was a green colour, about 18 inches in height, and was, from its medicinal properties, exceedingly sought after. One fetched at Tawaran the price of £400 to be paid in produce. The Naga was a jar two feet in height ornamented with Chinese dragons. This was at this time worth only £7–8; while the Rusa, covered with the figures of some kind of deer, was worth £15–16.[2] Another jar, the Ningkah, mentioned in another contemporary account, fetched $150.[3]

These jars were the principal commodity in the Chinese trade with Borneo and other islands. This trade may have been of the 'silent' variety, when Chinese junks, laden with silk, beads, iron,

[1] It is interesting to compare this description with that of a native plough of supposedly Chinese origin in the Philippines (see p. 613), and there is a reference to another plough not of local design in Malaya (see p. 314).

[2] Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 284.

Every Dyak tribe possessed some jars according to their riches or importance, though, as one European lady remarks, 'no one would suppose from their appearance that they were worth more than the common earthenware water-pots we use in our bath-houses'. They were, in fact (to judge from examples in the Sarawak Museum), of as cheap a quality as the Chinese trader could persuade the natives to purchase. Examples of these jars are illustrated in Plate 159 of N. Ottema, *Ceramiek Handboek*, 2nd ed. (Amsterdam, J. H. de Bussy, 1946).

One special jar, owned by the Sultan of Brunei, was supposed to have magical qualities, and Bisayas used to come with presents for the Sultan to obtain in return a little water from the jar with which to sprinkle their rice-fields to ensure good crops.

[3] L. W. Helms, *Pioneering in the Far East* (W. H. Allen, London, 1882) p. 153, cited by Ling Roth, op. cit. ii. 280.

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copper pots, and many kinds of jars arrived off the coast and made their presence known by beating on gongs. The natives would bring to the beach whatever they had to trade and then retire to a distance. The traders would take ashore what they considered the proper equivalent in terms of their own goods, and if this proved satisfactory they took the native articles and moved on to the next settlement.[1] But whether or no this method of trading was usual in later times, it seems that in the time spoken of by Chao Ju-kua (12th–13th centuries) buying and selling were carried on in a more friendly and civilized way. After a ship had arrived and had been boarded by the natives they mingled freely with the ship's folk. The custom was for native traders to assemble in crowds and carry the goods away with them in baskets, 'and even if one cannot at first know them and can but slowly distinguish the men who remove the goods there will be no loss'.[2]

More impressive, aesthetically speaking, than the jars are the pottery and china revealed by the pick and spade in mineral exploration. Mr Helms records that on one occasion his party found a number of paving tiles four inches thick, 'beautifully made of pebbles, concrete, quartz, etc. They had been polished, were clearly very old, and made by people of a higher civilization.' Were these, by any chance, relics of Chinese settlement?

The coming of the Europeans caused a break in the trading relations between China, Borneo, and the other Malaysian islands which had gone on for so long. In the year 1530 one of the functionaries in the capital addressed a memorial to the throne respecting the discontinuance of the tribute from Borneo. This memorial says:

> During the period Cheng-tc (1506–1521) the Franks (Portuguese) had been violently spreading their influence and the tribute had ceased. A few years afterwards the natives had tried to begin sending it again, but it was evident that their regard for the Chinese empire had suffered very much.

Finally, let us summarize what is known of Chinese intercourse with the Philippines prior to the Spanish period.

It is at a comparatively late date that the Philippines are first mentioned in Chinese history; and the fact is the more striking (says Laufer) since some of the adjacent isles to the south are touched upon much earlier. In the fifth year of Hung-wu (1372) the first embassy arrived in China with tribute, and the Emperor

[1] Fay Cooper Cole, op. cit. p. 28. [2] G. N. Steiger, op. cit. p. 205.

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reciprocated by dispatching an official with presents of silk gauze woven of gold and coloured threads to the king of the country. But (Laufer warns us) 'From this first mention of the Philippines in Chinese history we should not be so narrow-minded as to infer that Chinese intercourse with the Philippines dates from just the year 1372; on the contrary, the fact that there was a Philippine embassy in that year points to a long commercial intercourse between the two peoples which had escaped the knowledge of the court historiographers at Peking.'[1] The statement made in the Imperial Geography of the Ming (*Ta Ming I Feng Chi*) that no investigation of Luzon had been made by previous generations is contradicted by the fact that Philippine tribes are described in Chao Ju-kua's work of the thirteenth century.

Since Laufer wrote there has been considerable further investigation of the subject, and the present state of knowledge can best be summarized in the words of Dr H. Otley Beyer:

> It is improbable that many Chinese ships were engaged in this trade with the Philippines during the early period (at least before the late 11th–12th century part of it) and it is unlikely that there were any Chinese residents in the islands at that time . . . [re 12th–14th centuries] Chinese merchant colonies began to establish themselves in a few places where a fairly strong or well-organized native government gave prospect of protection. . . . With the death of Cheng Ho, however, and the passing of the Yung Lo regime, this Chinese attempt at dominions overseas also passed away . . . [re A.D. 1430–1450]. As Mohammedan influence spread eastward through the southern Philippines, and northward from Borneo into Luzon, the Siam and Indo-China trade was at first cut off, while the Chinese merchant vessels were forced to seek new trading routes leading around the eastern side of Luzon, and into the eastern Visayan Islands etc., where Islamic beliefs had not yet penetrated. . . . While the Chinese settlers intermarried freely in the country, built good houses, and taught their families better ways of living, they were not otherwise interested in converting or spreading new ideas among the native folk. Their influence was chiefly economic, and aside from the brief period of Yung Lo's empire, made no attempt to meddle or interfere with native political constitutions, social customs, or beliefs. . . .[2]

[1] Berthold Laufer, 'The Relations of the Chinese to the Philippine Islands', *Smithsonian Miscellaneous Collections* (quarterly issue), vol. 1 (September 1907) p. 251.

[2] H. Otley Beyer, *Early History of Philippine Relationships to Foreign Countries, especially China* (Manila, National Printing Company for the University of the Philippines Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology, 1948).

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121 What has been given above is only a brief outline of a vast subject of which the facts are, for many periods, largely unprecipitated. 167 In an attempt to confine this survey to manageable proportions and 177 to give it a contemporary focus, we have adopted the principle that our interest in the Chinese of Southeast Asia begins in earnest only when they had formed permanent settlements, and it is true to say that the majority of such settlements still remaining, outside Annam and Tongking, were founded within the last 350 years. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the stream of Chinese immigration into the region, swelling into spate in the second and third decades of the present century, was but an expansion of long pre-existing rivulets of intercourse.

167 After the great military expeditions of the early Mings, the urge to imperial expansion overseas appears to have gone out of the •175 Chinese. The self-contained spirit of the Middle Kingdom reas- 177 serted itself and the Emperors were content with adventures by land. It would indeed be harder to explain why the urge arose at all than why it subsided so soon. The fact remains that whereas the colonization of the Europeans followed in the wake of their fleets and soldiers or to lands obtained by treaty from the native rulers, the Chinese in the last three and a half centuries have entered Southeast Asia either as visiting merchants or as suppliants for permission to remain from the Javanese Sultans, or from the Spanish, Dutch, British, or French. They came no more as haughty emissaries of the Dragon Throne, armed to the teeth to enforce the imperial will, but as humble and peaceable shiploads of traders, artisans, or coolies, waiting, like Czech or Italian peasants on Ellis Island, for permission to enter the land of promise. But their meekness and peaceableness were in the long run to be far more forceful than the militancy of the Europeans; for where the latter came in their tens the Chinese came in their thousands, and when the Europeans have gone, they will remain.[1]

[1] While this Survey was in the press there appeared 'The Khmer Empire and the Malay Peninsula', by Lawrence Palmer Briggs, *Far Eastern Quarterly*, vol. ix, no. 3, May 1950, which adds valuable source material for Sino–Southeast Asia contacts.

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CHAPTER III

EMIGRATION TO THE 'NANYANG'

THE overseas Chinese are almost exclusively drawn from the southeastern provinces of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kwangsi—the great majority from the first two. This has mainly been due to population pressure and to the contiguity of these provinces to Southeast Asia.[1] This emigration was accentuated by internal troubles in China. In the Ming dynasty there had already been substantial emigration to the Nanyang, but a new wave was set up by the civil strife consequent on the change-over from the Ming to the Ch'ing, or Manchu, dynasty.[2] For example, the anti-Manchu pirate and patriot Koxinga, who had occupied Formosa, made descents on the coasts of Fukien in order to replenish his stores and at the same time embarrass the Manchu Government. Partly to cut off his supplies and partly to intimidate the population of these regions whose sympathies were anti-dynastic, the Manchus made the latter forsake a zone of country from about eight to thirty miles deep on the coasts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Chekiang. This zone was denuded of its crops and its villages were burnt down. A reference was made to this in the reign of the first Manchu Emperor when governors were ordered to give houses and land to such persons who had moved into the interior 'so that they might be satisfied'. The harsh treatment they received was undoubtedly an encouragement to many in these parts of China to seek refuge overseas.

Contacts with Europeans were also a subsidiary encouragement to emigration. The first European efforts to trade were centred in Kwangtung. In 1516 Perestrello came from Malacca to China; in 1517 de Andrada arrived in Canton and received permission from the viceroy to trade. The attitude of the Portuguese soon aroused the hostility of the Chinese and their trading depot was attacked and destroyed in 1522. They retired to Lampa in Kwangtung where

[1] Population pressure in China, especially in the nineteenth century, is instructively dealt with by G. E. Tyler, 'The Taiping Rebellion, its economic background and social theory', *Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, vol. xvi (1933) pp. 545–614.

[2] See J. J. L. Duyvendak, 'Chinese in the Dutch East Indies', ibid. vol. xi. (1927) pp. 1–15.

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they maintained a trading post for the next fifty years. Another expedition reached the coast of Fukien in 1518 and established depots at Ch'üanchowfu, north of Amoy, at Foochow, and at Ningpo in Chekiang. Between 1545 and 1549 an imperial edict for the extermination of the Portuguese was enforced wherever possible. Nevertheless Macao was founded as a trading post in 1557. The Portuguese paid rent for the Macao Peninsula until 1849. During the eighteenth century Macao was the chief port for the Western trade in China. The Spanish next opened up direct relations with the Chinese, using Manila as their base, but the trade between the Philippines and Amoy was almost entirely in Chinese hands. The port of Amoy from 1730 to 1842 was closed to all foreigners except Spaniards. The Dutch made attempts to open up trade at Canton in 1604 and 1607 but were defeated by the Portuguese interests at Macao. Though they eventually occupied Formosa, they were driven out by Koxinga in 1661. Further efforts made by the Dutch to obtain recognition of their trade were without success, and it was not until 1762 that they were able to establish a factory at Canton. The English made their first essay to join in the trade in 1596, but it was a failure. They tried in 1647 to operate under Portuguese auspices, meeting, however, with little success. The East India Company renewed the attempt to trade with Canton in 1664 and 1674, but were foiled, mainly by the Portuguese. The Company did, however, succeed in 1667 and 1670 in trading at Amoy and Formosa, but their factory in the latter place was closed in 1681. In 1685 an imperial decree opened all the ports of China to foreign trade; but Canton and Amoy remained the principal trading entrepôts.

A circumstance which tended towards centring the foreign trade on Canton and eventually confining it to this one port was the establishment of a monopoly by the Chinese Government. In 1702 an official called a Hoppo, or emperor's merchant, was appointed at Canton and became the sole broker for all purchases and sales. Two years later the Hoppo had to admit certain other merchants into a share of his monopoly. Henceforth the trade increased in bulk and flourished, though subject to very severe restrictions and a rigorous disciplining of the foreign merchants, most of whom had to withdraw to Macao in the non-trading season. In 1757 an imperial edict prohibited all foreign trade at any port other than Canton. Attempts to improve the conditions of trade and to establish relations on a proper footing led to the sending of embassies to

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Peking by the Dutch and the British, but without concrete result. The situation continued down to the First China War of 1839–42.

It will be seen, then, that Chinese contacts with foreign traders were practically confined to the Kwangtung and Fukien ports, though the intercourse was even then a restricted one. It was not the policy of the Spanish or of the Dutch (except at the beginning) to attract the Chinese to their colonies; it was only after 1786, when the British began to make settlements in the Malay Peninsula, that the Chinese found an unqualified welcome. The capitalistic development of colonies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries had not yet begun, and there was no demand for coolie labour on a large scale before then. The Americans first traded with Canton in 1784, but it was not until 1848 that the first Chinese immigrants arrived at San Francisco.[1]

Such were some of the circumstances which induced, or paved the way for, Chinese emigration to the Nanyang. Our task must now be to investigate the factors which discouraged this emigration.

Ancestor worship was a strong force in discouraging the Chinese from emigrating. The spirits of the dead needed the constant attendance of the living to ensure their welfare, and those who deserted the vicinity of the graves of their ancestors and left their spirits without sacrificial offerings and ritual attention were guilty of unfilial conduct. Thus it was at all times that only those who were forced by dire necessity left their native villages, and they were regarded as outcasts and vagabonds. It was natural, therefore, that a great many refugees and criminals should have been included among the emigrants.[2]

Religion was reinforced by Government policy. The Emperors took the view that the loss of subjects was not a loss to be compensated for by any trade advantages. Under the Mings the law was not so strict as it became later under the Ch'ings (the Manchus were also more orthodox Confucians than the Mings—and aliens are frequently more orthodox and conservative than the people

[1] So it is commonly stated, but in the correspondence relating to a project to send Chinese to Trinidad in 1806 ('Notices of Pinang', *Journal of the Indian Archipelago*, vol. vi (1852) pp. 145–72) it is mentioned that Chinese had already been taken to Nootka Sound in North America. The writer has so far been unable to discover the facts of this matter.

[2] H. Gottwaldt, *Die Uberseeische Auswanderung der Chinesen* (Bremen, Max Moessler, 1903), insists that 'only the scum of the Chinese go abroad'.

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Chapter Twenty-five

PEOPLES, POLITICS AND PROSPECTS IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

101 184 361 105 THE setting of Southeast Asia may be summed up as one of extremes of relief (deltaic plains and mountains) and a climate mostly approaching the wet limit for plant life but merging into monsoonal types. To this setting the people have made varying responses, ranging from migrant food gatherers and hunters in the jungles, to subsistence farmers in the plains, but all turning upon woody materials for weapons, implements, house-structures and domestic utensils, upon rice, the cereal of the wet extreme, and upon social systems of communal help. The whole social and economic life has been galvanised over the past century or two by being more and more drawn into commercial and industrial activities developed in response to and on the basis of external needs for the minerals and agricultural products of Southeast Asia, whereas prior to that time the region was touched only by a trickle of traders moving between India and China.

FACTORS IN THE HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY

174 177 311 175 Several factors account for the difficulty of obtaining firm data to fill in our general picture of the historical geography of Southeast Asia. In the first place, there grew up no strong literary tradition to last through the centuries and record the past in a form other than mythical. Here tradition is largely oral and literature essentially Indian rather than indigenous. And whatever there was of local record and history has rotted away quickly, the climate, the ants, insects and moulds soon destroying anything on wood, paper, leather or cloth. Moreover, in this setting of swamps and forest, the most easily available material is wood, and artistic tradition expressed in wood, whether in carvings, buildings or tools, rapidly disintegrates, leaving little of that sort of evidence which is the basis of our facts about early periods in other regions. Buildings and carvings on stone were not normal expressions of Southeast Asia people where over large areas stone is not easily come by and where

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

FIG. 113.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia during Indian Colonial Period

implements had not in any case developed far enough to deal with stone. Hence monumental evidence in Southeast Asia is so largely Indian, an introduction by foreigners using styles and techniques developed in their home settings, and most developed in the drier parts of this region, where stone is more accessible. On the clay lands, historic brick structures, also an Indian innovation, weather to nothing very quickly. At Angkor may be seen the power of quick-growing tropical trees to shatter and break down temples and palaces built of stone and lateritic blocks.

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This, too, is a region of natural calamities, difficult though it is to pin-point them. Little kingdoms have been wiped out in a few hours by Javanese volcanoes, as in A.D. 1006 when the flourishing city of Dharmavamsa (a great king of Central Java) was reduced to ashes by "a great calamity," probably an explosion and lava outflow of the Merapi volcano. Settlements along rivers have been obliterated when huge mud-flows swept down from loose ashes on the flanks of new eruptions, possibly accounting for our ignorance of east Sumatran kingdoms. Coasts have altered through the years

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133 and deltas have changed; areas which once were shallow sea have
175 become sedimented to swamps, a process by which Cambodia has been cut off as the Lower Mekong built up mud-flats isolating Tonle Sap from contact with the sea. The evolution of new routes has caused some old centres of power to fade into mere fishing villages, evidenced in the decline of Takhola and Bandon after the sea route through the Straits of Malacca became more generally

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

FIG. 114.—Historic Pattern of Southeast Asia at the Islamisation Period

175 used than that across Kra. Plagues have laid waste whole cities, as
164 when Uthong in about 1350 was devastated by cholera and its population fled. The region is still one where malaria, dysentery, cholera and plague are endemic, more especially in the older, more congested territories like Java. These diseases have frequently flared up into appalling epidemics killing thousands of people, epidemics reflecting a relation between bacteria and the climate (which encourages bacterial reproduction), the population density, the difficulties of sewage disposal and social habits of indifference to hygiene (which has no ill effects among lonely settlements in the forest but becomes a social menace in towns). Fevers and virulent diseases have frequently ravaged the local people, debilitated them, and wiped out their settlements. The region is strewn with ruins of towns now abandoned, and with ruined groups of people who have degenerated physically by disease and under-nourishment. Southeast Asia proved capable of engulfing rather than enshrining those moving into it to live.

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Further to complicate the historic geography was the fact that the literary people, the monks and religious men, were Indian or Indian-minded for long periods, disinterested in mundane records, and following the custom, still evident among many Southeast Asia people today, of avoiding personal names, so that anonymity, obscurity and confused nomenclature veil the past even in such records as do exist. Many experiments in writing styles were developed among these isolated and complex peoples and often inscriptions made in them cannot be translated today. Because of the dispersal tendencies within the territories themselves and the lack of focus to the region as a whole, no great depositories of learning were established in Southeast Asia to gather and conserve the record of its past.

Population Changes

Broadly speaking, the region has been until recently one of very thin population and large patches of it still contain populations of remarkably low density. Direct evidence of densities are scanty for periods farther back than this century, yet it seems probable that the whole of Southeast Asia in 1800 contained only about ten million people, when the region was probably as thinly peopled in its most attractive areas as Upper Burma and Upper Siam, the least attractive and developed areas, are today; Malaya then contained about a quarter million people, Java about four million, Burma probably less than two million. It was, even at the end of the 18th century, a zone of labour shortage and the objective of the local princelings of the times was to get hands, the basic power resource of their time, the one way of securing a small surplus from their fundamentally subsistent territories. Outsiders were not greatly attracted to Southeast Asia itself, as apart from the routes through it. To Spain its old colony, the Philippines, was no great asset and more related to Mexico than to Spain, remote and ready to drop from the Spanish orbit during the 19th century. To Holland, its colony in Java was a company venture that yielded little direct profit for many years and was at times on the verge of bankruptcy.

But the last 150 years brought tremendous changes in population. First, on the heels of the Industrial Revolution in Europe, came a revival and an expanded volume of trade between the Indian Ocean and the Far East, a stream which threaded the seaways of

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

642 sections with an elaborate western superstructure over native life; in both native welfare has lagged behind economic progress, and, in both, during the present century, a growing impatience of western rule has found expression in a nationalist movement. These features are characteristic of tropical dependencies in general. Since Burma and Java furnish extreme types of direct and indirect rule, and of development by native and by western enterprise, the comparison between them would seem to furnish a useful starting point for a more general enquiry into colonial policy and practice. Such an enquiry is indeed necessary if we are to understand the problems of either Burma or Java or of any tropical dependency, for it is only against a background of general principles that the phenomena of western rule in any region of the tropics assume their due proportions, and that we can reasonably anticipate finding a satisfactory solution for the many weighty problems of colonial policy and practice. The enquiry may well seem, and is indeed, beyond the competence of any single student, whose intimate acquaintance with practical administration must of necessity be limited. But one conclusion to which the following enquiry points is the need for better knowledge of the facts and better understanding of their implications, and to the urgency of international co-operation in the comparative study of colonial affairs.

2. Survey of Colonial Policy

175 Of late years there has been a growing interest in colonial policy and colonial relations. To this many factors have contributed. Prominent among them are unrest in the tropics, consequent on the rise of modern nationalism, and the jealousy of non-colonial powers. Thus colonial policy has a double aspect, domestic and international. These are interrelated, for, while the advantages accruing to colonial powers from their dependencies arouse envy, and stimulate other powers to assert their claims by force of arms, tropical unrest serves as a pretext and a tool for intervention. The international aspect of colonial relations will require attention in due place, but it is convenient first to discuss the relations between colonial powers and their dependencies.

'Discussions of this matter often contrast the high aspirations of modern colonial policy with the selfish exploitation of the past. Thus, according to Lord Hailey, 'the imperialist sentiment which animated much of our public policy in the latter part of the last century led us along paths some of which we should not be inclined to follow

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

to-day'.[1] And a well-known Dutch colonial statesman says, 'He who would maintain that in the best colonial empires this predatory but profitable policy belongs to history will have to admit that it is in several respects not too remote history.'[2] This view hardly does justice to our fathers and grandfathers, who indeed themselves put forward similar pretensions. Dutch writers admit as not without validity the charges levelled against western enterprise in Java at the onset of the great depression of the thirties. But that was the generation of the Ethical leaders who aspired to build a brave new world in 1900. They in turn succeeded the Liberals who had thought to introduce a golden age in 1870 on the principle of freedom. The Liberals condemned, as rooted in unrighteousness, the system by which Van den Bosch had expected to restore prosperity to a country ruined by the reforms that Raffles, a generation earlier, had claimed would bestow liberty and welfare on millions of his fellow human beings. We may, and should be, wiser than our fathers, and should have learned from their mistakes; but it would be wise to bear in mind the parable of the Pharisee and the Publican. Although chartered companies may have disregarded the moral obligations of sovereignty, European powers which have accepted responsibility for dominion in the tropics have always claimed a moral basis for their activities.

Spain and Portugal. The earliest system of colonial rule may indeed be distinguished as the religious system. It has been well said that the colonial adventure of the Portuguese was also the last of the crusades. When Alexander VI in 1493 adjudicated on the rival claims of Spain and Portugal to undiscovered heathen continents and islands, he made it a condition that they should exert all diligence to convert their subjects to Christianity and 'instruct them in the Catholic Faith and good manners'.[3] They both took this injunction seriously. Paraguay under the Jesuits has often been cited as a model of colonial rule; in Manila the Spaniards founded the oldest western university in Asia, and by the end of the nineteenth century western culture was more widely spread in the Philippines than in any part of Asia. In the Moluccas the Portuguese established a Christian seminary within a few years of their arrival, and their claim that, if they did not aim solely at conversion, neither did they aim solely at commerce, is justified by the fact that, long after they have lost their colonies, many of their former subjects still retain their Christian faith.

[1] *Britain and Her Dependencies*, p. 46. [2] Hart, *Asiatic Review*, 1941, p. 629.
[3] Danvers, F. C., *The Portuguese in India* (1894), II, 483.

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Chartered Companies. The chartered companies, which mark the next stage of western tropical enterprise, were professedly mercantile associations, and, so long as they prospered, were practically independent of the state. Their object was to pay good dividends to their shareholders, and they subordinated political considerations to economic ends. Yet the Dutch in early days were zealous for the conversion of their subjects, and it was only later, when religious enthusiasm had declined, that they came to disregard everything but profit. Even so, during the eighteenth century, there were aspirations after a more generous conception of colonial rule, and the high official who bequeathed his estate as a permanent heritage for his Christian slaves was not alone in caring for the welfare of the people.[1] Still one must accept the verdict on the Dutch East India Company that 'its polestar was profit and the lodestone greed'; and in the eighteenth century this was notoriously true also of the English Company. It is not without significance that in both cases this concentration on economic ends led to bankruptcy, and at about the same time; the English Company was brought under State control, and the Dutch Company was taken over by the State.

Liberalism. In both countries the assumption of effective state control over tropical administration synchronized with the dawn of modern Liberalism. We have already remarked that Liberalism had a double aspect, material and moral, economic and social. Liberals believed in economic freedom—freedom of person, property and trade—and trusted to economic freedom as a guarantee of progress. When the English Government assumed control over India by Pitt's Act of 1784, the Industrial Revolution was already presaging a revolution in colonial relations. Manchester cotton goods were beginning to compete successfully with Indian calicoes and muslins in England; the first consignment reached India in 1786, and from 1814 onwards they rapidly displaced native products. During the same period the ideas that subsequently came to be termed Liberal were making headway, and the East India Company, after a vain effort to retain its monopoly, adopted them. The doctrine of economic freedom implied the introduction of a money economy, and the encouragement of native enterprise which would enable the people to buy imported goods. In assuming that, equally with western peoples, the oriental was alive to the desire of improving his condition, and in introducing the principle of equality before the

[1] Vlekke, p. 187.

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law, Liberalism, even in its economic aspect, was strongly coloured by humanitarian ideals. 175

These ideals were carried further in its social doctrine that all men were equal and had a natural right to freedom of speech and religion. Liberals believed that men had a right to political freedom, to live their own life in their own way under their own national institutions. They hoped to see India free, and tied to England only by ties of interest and affection. If the maintenance of law and order were the sole functions of the state, it seemed that the replacement of British magistrates by Indians should make India capable of self-government. Moreover, with the introduction of direct rule on western principles, economy demanded the employment of natives as officials. This made rapid progress and was adopted as a principle in 1833 when, on the renewal of the Company's charter, it was laid down that 'no native of the said Indian territories shall, by reason only of his place of birth, descent, colour or any of them be disabled from holding any place, office or employment under the Company'. By the end of the century the subordinate establishment was almost wholly Indian, and many Indians held high judicial and executive appointments. The Liberal faith included also a belief in the virtue of self-governing institutions on the English model. The largely European Presidency towns already enjoyed self-government; from 1842 attempts were made to apply the principle of local self-government in the interior, and it was widely extended from 1881–2. Meanwhile Indians had already been admitted to the Central Legislature from 1861 and at the same time Provincial Legislative Councils were established. This project of self-government reached its logical conclusion in 1917, when the Secretary of State for India announced responsible government as the goal of British policy.

While Liberals believed in economic freedom as good business, and in political freedom as a natural right, they looked on education as the main instrument of freedom. They held that the wide diffusion of western education would inspire the masses with the desire of improving their condition, dispel superstition, substitute Christianity for idolatry, and promote affection towards British rule. So early as 1793 Wilberforce tried to interest Parliament in the education of Indians. In 1815 the Governor-General declared his anxiety to see some system of public instruction established.[1] In 1854 the East India Company, in a despatch which laid the foundations of the

[1] *IG*, IV, 409, 413, 417.

7: Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

175 modern system of public instruction, proclaimed the advancement of the people through primary education as its main objective, and in all subsequent pronouncements on the subject this leading principle has been reaffirmed. Thus for about a hundred years from 1813 the lofty sentiments of Liberalism inspired British rule in India.

Meanwhile Britain had been carving out a vast new colonial empire in Africa under conditions very different from those of India. Instead of a populous country with an ancient agricultural civilization, there were empty lands and backward peoples. But the empty lands contained resources needed on a large scale for industry in Europe, and capital was available in Europe for the development of these resources by western enterprise. The Ashanti War of 1874 marked the beginning of British penetration into the interior of Africa. It was closely followed by the flotation of numerous large companies to develop the new territories under a charter from the State, as this 'offered a means of asserting British sovereignty without the expense and responsibility that sovereignty usually entails'.[1] The companies appealed to Parliament and the public for support not merely as commercial projects, but as instruments for spreading light in 'the dark continent' and as a response to Livingstone's appeal for commerce and Christianity. But they lacked the resources of a sovereign power and, in the interest of the shareholders, had to keep down the cost of administration. 'Every Government in Africa has been faced with the initial difficulty of administering an extensive area with a small European staff, frequently ignorant of local native custom and language; in every case it has found itself obliged, in the early days of its rule, to make use of chiefs or other native authorities, and the extent to which it has done so has depended on circumstances rather than on any difference of principle.'[2] It was the economic environment and not national political philosophy that dictated the adoption of the system of indirect rule.

In Nigeria, however, Sir George Goldie found a virtue in necessity.

'Even an imperfect and tyrannical native African administration, if its extreme excesses were controlled by European supervision, would be, in the early stages, productive of far less discomfort to its subjects than well-intentioned but ill-directed efforts of European magistrates, often young and headstrong, and not invariably gifted with sympathy and introspective powers. If the welfare of the native is to be considered, if dangerous revolts

[1] Burns, p. 163.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 527.

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are to be obviated, the general principles of ruling on African principles through native rulers must be followed for the present.'[1]

As a corollary it followed that, alongside the native administration, there should be 'colonial' courts to deal according to western law and procedure with 'cases involving non-natives, to exercise jurisdiction over natives in areas where native courts do not exist, and, where native courts exist, to deal with cases involving natives which are held to be unsuitable for these courts'.[2] As in Netherlands India there arose a system of indirect rule and dual administration. But the system is notably different in Dutch and British practice. In Britain there is a stronger tradition of the rule of law than on the continent of Europe, and British colonial administration owes much to pre-conceptions based on direct rule in India. Thus British colonial administration on the system of indirect rule emphasizes the judicial aspect of native authority, encourages greater formality in native courts, and insists on close supervision over native judicial procedure by British officials. On the Dutch system even the European officials are policemen, agents of policy; on the British system even native officials tend to become magistrates and judges, servants of the law.

The adoption of indirect rule in Africa did not, however, involve a departure from the principle of *laissez-faire*; rather it carried this principle still further by abstaining from intervention in native ways of life. But whether under direct or indirect rule, the lofty aspirations of Liberals were disappointing in practice, and, beyond narrow limits, conduced neither to economic progress nor to native welfare. For a time the prospect of easy money that had attracted capital in the first instance was realized, but 'the earliest attempts to develop trade sometimes involved the destructive spoliation of the resources of the colony. Rubber or forest timber was exhausted without proper replacement; accumulations of ivory were for a period obtained by exchange for cheap imports. Such a policy of exploitation could not continue indefinitely. Once the realities of the situation were understood, capital was less easily attracted.'[3] Moreover, the concentration of political and economic power in the same hands had shown 'the difficulties of reconciling the responsibilities of the administration with the interests of shareholders, and of demarcating justifiable administrative compulsion from forced labour for the purpose of profit making'.[4] Thus, during the last quarter of the nineteenth

[1] *African Survey*, p. 417.
[2] *Ib.* pp. 286 ff.
[3] *Ib.* p. 1314.
[4] *Ib.* p. 1314.

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175 century, initial progress was followed by stagnation, and the aspirations of improving native welfare proved illusive. In India likewise under direct rule, Liberal hopes and forecasts proved illusive. The cultivators, burdened with debt, were losing their land to moneylenders, and public instruction, so far from dispelling the superstition of the masses, did not even reach them, while among the middle classes, who went to school to earn a living, the spread of education, instead of fostering goodwill to Britain and diffusing Christianity, bred growing disaffection and a reaction to an aggressive Hinduism. After the roseate dawn of early Liberalism the sky turned dark and stormy, and the century closed in 'gloom and depression'.[1] Liberals, regarding economic freedom as the key to progress and welfare, released economic forces which for a time furthered economic progress, but, at the same time, preyed on social welfare, setting bounds to progress, leading to stagnation and foreshadowing decline.

Under Dutch rule Liberal principles were differently applied, and colonial practice evolved in a contrary direction, but with similar results. On the restoration of the Dutch possessions in 1816–18, the leading statesmen from the King downwards admired all that was 'brave and liberal' and professed warm sympathy for 'the little man'. The King drafted a constitution along these lines for the Indies, and the commissioners sent to introduce it 'decided at once that the time had come when the Indies should be governed for the sake of its own people and not for that of the Netherlands'.[2] They found that Raffles had introduced, at least on paper, a system of direct rule, applying Liberal individual principles, far more thoroughly than any Dutch statesman had ever contemplated. Brief experience showed that 'measures that if seen at three thousand miles apparently are liberal, here prove to be highly illiberal in their effects' and implied 'the protection of European landowners at the expense of the native population'. Affairs drifted in confusion until the arrival of Van den Bosch in 1839. He also claimed Liberal views, but denounced the 'perverted Liberalism' of Raffles as unsuited to the Javanese, and propounded 'a Liberal policy adapted to their character and institutions'. He reverted to the Dutch system of indirect rule through native chieftains, which the commissioners, though recognizing in policy, had departed from in practice. While repudiating the Liberal principle of individual freedom under western law, he appealed, more

[1] *IG*, II, 526.
[2] Vlekke, pp. 254, 256.

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logically, to the principle of *laissez-faire* as justifying non-interference with native institutions. It is, however, no fortuitous coincidence that indirect rule in Java was profitable to the Dutch and direct rule in India profitable to the British.

The Culture system introduced by Van den Bosch gave a temporary stimulus to economic progress, but in the long run proved detrimental to native welfare and led to economic stagnation. Also it was unprofitable to a later generation of more orthodox Liberals, who came into power in the Netherlands in 1848 and during the next twenty years gradually obtained control over colonial policy. They substituted private enterprise for state enterprise, and thereby gave a new impulse to economic progress. Like Liberals in Britain they believed in education 'to spread light in India'. But under indirect rule there was little demand for natives educated on western lines, and, with little to gain from schooling, there was little demand among the natives for schools. Western education made slow progress in Java as compared with India. On the other hand, western enterprise in Java required a large and healthy population and, in respect of medical assistance and a care for hygiene in rural areas, Java was ahead of India. The system of rule through native chieftains, introduced by Van den Bosch, made inadequate provision for the Europeans who crowded in when Java was thrown open to western private enterprise, and the dual character of the administration, with different laws for Europeans and natives, became more prominent. Liberals of all hues wanted an administration along western lines for the European community, and urged the need for decentralization—the delegation of power from the home to the colonial Government, from the colonial Government to departments and local officials, and from the bureaucracy to local bodies. From 1848 onwards various aspects of decentralization were discussed, and every year, with the growth of western enterprise, it became more urgent. Finally, in 1903, western political institutions were introduced in local government, and in 1918 the creation of the Volksraad as an advisory body marked a long stride towards the adoption of Liberal principles in the central government. Thus, whereas in British dependencies the system of administration developed during the nineteenth century from direct towards indirect rule, in Netherlands India the tendency was in the contrary direction.

The Liberalism of Van den Bosch was profitable to the Dutch of 1830 and the later individualist Liberalism profited the Dutch of 1870,

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175 but in neither case need one question that the appeal to humanitarian ideals was genuine. The Liberals, like those in England, looked forward, in two senses, to a golden age. But in Java, as in India, the century ended in stagnation and depression, with chambers of commerce in the Netherlands demanding an enquiry into the 'decline of welfare'. Under Dutch rule, as under British rule, the Liberal policy of *laissez-faire* gave place to a constructive policy of efficiency and social justice.

Construction. In 1900 the British Government was less reluctant than in 1870 to accept imperial responsibilities, and Joseph Chamberlain, as an apostle of efficiency and social justice, was trying to put the British Empire on a business footing, with Kipling as the popular exponent of the 'White Man's Burden'. This 'involved a new philosophy of [colonial] politics and an ethical standard, serious and not ignoble'.[1] The failure, economic and political, of the chartered companies in Africa, implied that the State, on taking over charge of the colonies, should intervene actively to promote economic development and to enhance native welfare. This new constructive policy with its double aspect came to be known as 'the dual mandate'. In India, under direct rule, the administration, chiefly at the instance of Lord Curzon, proliferated new economic and welfare services, while in Africa and elsewhere the conception of indirect rule acquired a new character. Formerly indirect rule had been justified as a means of protecting the natives from the impact of the west, now it was conceived as a means 'to graft our higher civilization upon the soundly rooted native stock . . . moulding it and establishing it into lines consonant with modern ideas and higher standards'.[2] It was no longer a negative system of *laissez-faire*, but an active policy of economic and social construction. Liberals looked to freedom as a key to economic progress, and regarded economic progress as a *cause* of native welfare, leading *automatically* to political independence. Modern colonial theory regards economic progress as a *condition* of native welfare, and native welfare as a *condition* of political advancement, but recognizes the need for state intervention to further economic progress. Liberals thought to promote welfare through freedom; the modern tendency is to promote welfare, even at the expense of freedom.

Simultaneously, with this new trend in British colonial policy, Dutch colonial policy turned from Liberalism to a new constructive

[1] Buchan, J., *Memory-Hold-the-Door* (1943), p. 125.
[2] *African Survey*, p. 432.

7. Furnivall G-4, 5 (no date) 1948 AL1 Southeast Asia AL1

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policy avowedly based on 'ethical' principles. This found its first practical expression in the Village Act of 1906, intended to strengthen corporate village life and thereby 'stimulate the process of social growth and enable local officials to cope with their prime function, the care of public welfare'. Thus both Dutch and English may fairly claim that, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, their colonial policy has always been inspired by high ideals, and has kept in sight the dual aim of increasing the contribution of the tropics to the welfare of the world, while promoting the welfare of the people. Yet even the 'ethical' system and the theory of the 'White Man's Burden' are now disavowed, as illustrating the predatory past when we followed paths that we should now be reluctant to pursue. How far this criticism may be justified we shall have to examine more closely when dealing with modern colonial policy and practice. All we are now trying to show is that the inspiration of colonial policy by humanitarian ideals is no modern invention, but as old as western rule.

'But policy is a matter not only of purpose but performance, and it must be judged by its operation in practice.' In politics, as in law, men must be held to intend the natural consequences of their acts, and the natural consequences of colonial practice have differed widely from the humanitarian aims set forth in colonial policy. This has often been attributed to hypocrisy. On the suppression of the slave trade in 1807, humanitarians advocated the encouragement of commerce as a means of creating an interest which would have a strong motive for co-operating with the abolition of slavery. 'Thus at an early date that intimate connection between idealism and commerce was established which has exposed African administration to the easy cynicism of those who see in every declaration of interest in the African's welfare the veiled intention to secure benefits for the mother country.' In French colonial policy there is often a note of warm cordiality, 'qui *parfois* part vraiment du cœur'.[1] Raffles had a sincere liking for Malays, and claimed 'the happiness to release several millions of his fellow creatures from a state of bondage and oppression' under the Dutch; but Van den Bosch regarded him as solely concerned to build up British trade. Van den Bosch was unquestionably a philanthropist who, long before he ruled Java, had shown practical sympathy with the Socialist experiments of Robert Owen, yet, according to his Liberal successors, he 'wrapped a gilt

[1] *African Survey*, p. 133; Bousquet, p. 156 (italics *sic*).

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coating of philanthropic theory round a bitter pill of practice'. The Liberal leader, Van de Putte, was genuinely convinced that economic individualism would create welfare in Java, but Ethical critics remarked that Liberals 'balanced their love for the natives against regard for their own pockets'. The Ethical reformers in their turn were charged by a later generation with 'hoisting the Cross in place of the Jolly Roger, but without changing the sailing orders'.

Yet charges of conscious hypocrisy cannot be sustained. In almost every generation there have been reformers sincerely zealous for native welfare but, while picturing a golden future in the warm glow of their imagination, they have judged their predecessors in the cold light of actual achievement. In colonial relations a wide gap between policy and practice seems perennial, as if there were some factor in the nature of such relations by which the lofty aims of policy are continually frustrated in their practical application. Let us try to elucidate the cause of this divergence by studying the evolution of tropical economy under the rule of *laissez-faire*, when economic forces were left uncontrolled.

3. Tropical Economy

In the study of tropical economy it seems necessary, even at the risk of emphasizing platitudes, to go back to elementary principles of economic activity. The endeavours of all colonial powers to enhance progress and welfare in their tropical dependencies are of necessity conditioned by certain economic laws. One fundamental principle is the economic process of natural selection by the survival of the cheapest, known technically as the Law of Substitution. This does not imply deliberate substitution, but is a natural law operating independently of human volition; it is the economic aspect of the evolutionary principle of natural selection by the survival of the fittest. In times of famine, the man or beast that needs less for subsistence is, other things being equal, most likely to survive. Stronger men may take the food out of his mouth, but the ability to sustain life on a minimum of nourishment has in itself survival value. In Burma some poor flooded areas gave a yield below the margin of subsistence for Burmans, and they are cultivated by Indians who can make a living on them. This process of natural selection is reinforced by reason. Everyone would pay twopence rather than threepence for the same thing; that is rational, a matter of universal common sense. There is an economic process, active everywhere and always, tending in all

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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Southeast Asia and World History

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At the present time the whole of Southeast Asia is obviously and dangerously entangled in world history. Often it is suggested that this is quite a new thing. Actually, there is nothing new in the entanglement of Southeast Asia in world history. After pointing out that the Southeast Asian states derived their civilization from India but fell within the political orbit of China, Professor Coedes summarizes the consequences:

> Most of these states have reacted to the great shocks that have disturbed the Indian peninsular and the Middle Kingdom. The conquests of Samudragupta in the Ganges Valley and South India in the 4th century and the expansionist policy of Chola emperors of Tanjore in the 11th century have had their repercussions on the other side of the Bay of Bengal. Even more markedly has the history of Further India been influenced by affairs in China. The Chinese have never looked favorably on the growth of strong powers in the southern seas, and it deserves notice that Funan, Cambodia, and the Javanese and Sumatran realms reached the zenith of their prosperity during just those epochs when the great dynasties of China were enfeebled. Also these countries are mutually linked together by numerous ties, geographic and economic, and every revolution in any one of them, by disturbing the whole region, has had repercussions on the others.[5]

Similarly, Krom suggests links between the course of events in India and the spread of Indian settlements over Southeast Asia.[6]

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In a talk on the Tropical Far East and world history at the Siam Society, Bangkok, Furnivall pointed to economic

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5. J. S. Furnivall, "The Tropical Far East and World History," Journal of the Siam Society, Volume 39, Part 2 (January 1952), pp. 120-21.

6. Ibid., p. 121.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 geography for an explanation of the relations between South-
439 east Asia and the outer world. The history of the China trade and the spice trade, Furnivall indicated, had revealed that Southeast Asia was of minor importance in each trade route, but it was significant as a byway along both routes, and it was sensitive accordingly to convulsions affecting the course of trade along either route. In Furnivall's words:

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> For China there have always been two main lines of communication with the West: the land route across central Asia, and the sea route round the coast. Throughout the ages traders have followed whichever route seemed easier. Both routes, however, are liable to interruption. The land route is exposed to wild hordes in central Asia and to the results of political catastrophes in the Middle and Near East. The sea route can easily be blocked at its main gateway, the Straits of Malacca. Yet, when both these two main routes are blocked, there is still a byway. Traffic can still find a way down the great rivers of Southeast Asia -- the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Mekong, and the Red River -- diverging when convenient to the shorter rivers, the Sittang and the Menam. Time and again these rivers, and especially the Irrawaddy, have played a part in history.
>
> For the trade in spices from the Moluccas, the Straits of Malacca are of supreme importance; there is only one main route. But this narrow channel can easily be held against outsiders. When it is blocked, however, there are two byways. One byway is through the Sunda Straits between Java and Sumatra; repeatedly throughout the course of history we find mention of Bantam under various names, and of places close to Bantam -- Jakarta or Batavia, and Benkulen. There is also a second byway, from various points along the western coast of Burma and Malaya cutting across the mainland to the Gulf of Siam or continuing further to the Mekong and Annam.[7]

Colonization, Old and New

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The search for gold following Vespasian's placing of an embargo on this precious metal from Rome during 69-79 A.D.

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7. Ibid., p. 121-22.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AC7 Central Thai
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175 439 648 was suggested by Furnivall as a cause of the foundation of Indian trading centers at convenient sites along the coasts and main rivers of Southeast Asia. The same author places the date of the first Indian colonization in the area at about 150 A.D.[8] Harrison, however, maintains that the first definite Indian settlements were established in the first century A.D.[9]

175 177 563 648 Indian settlements were typically colonial in the old sense of foreign settlement without foreign rule. The settlers came as traders, intermarried with the local people, acquired wealth, and formed an aristocracy. Then, as new migration ceased, the Indian rulers and aristocracy were absorbed into the people. In the inscriptions, the language and written characters took on native forms, and the names of persons and places were no longer Indian but native. Similarly, in the religious monuments and other buildings a native style was superimposed on the earlier Indian models.

175 177 648 Most authors have credited these Indian settlers with having brought Indian culture to Southeast Asia. Harrison, for example, takes for granted that "Indians who voyaged overseas to Southeast Asia naturally brought with them the ideas and practices of Hinduism and Buddhism."[10] He further speculates that "traders, adventurers and craftsmen were followed by Brahman and Buddhist priests and teachers,

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8. Ibid., p. 127.

9. Brian Harrison, South-east Asia (London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1954), p. 10.

10. Ibid., p. 12.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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carrying the civilizing influence of Indian cultural and spiritual life and implanting it in these new lands by introducing the art of writing and the classical Sanskrit language and literature; bringing as well their own vernacular languages to enrich the vocabularies of Southeast Asia.[11] It may be argued, nevertheless, that since there is little good evidence for any large Indian emigration to Southeast Asia, much Indian culture could have been brought back by cosmopolitanized Southeast Asian traders who often spent months in India waiting for the monsoons to change their direction.[12] It should be noted in this connection that during this time of early Indian colonization trade relations were also extended westward by Indonesians (who earlier reached Madagascar) and other Southeast Asians.

During the expansion of Islam, from 1350 to 1500, Moslem colonization followed the Indian pattern. Thus we may say that formerly a colony was merely a settlement in a foreign land and the settler had little or no political connection with the home land. The Indian and Moslem became foreign rulers, but they did not establish foreign rule. Subsequently, the Portuguese and Spaniards came as royal agents and with a warrant from the Pope to undertake both the conquest and conversion of the people. The old idea of a colony as a settlement survived: there were grandees

11. Ibid., pp. 15-16.

12. The author is indebted to Professor Lauriston Sharp for the development of this idea.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953) 1956 AO7 Central Thai
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175 with large estates, permanent immigrants of lower rank who
648 married native women, and priests spending a lifetime in
569 their parishes. But the colonies were ruled by Governors from Europe. They were both settlers and rulers. The Dutch came merely as traders, but they could obtain tropical produce only in the form of tribute; economic circumstances required them to accept sovereignty on behalf of the home company and to rule the people indirectly through native chieftains, and also to settle permanently, though on a comparatively small scale, to supervise native cultivation. They were primarily rulers and were settlers only by force of circumstance. In the 19th century the English carried the process a stage further. Through the industrial revolution they had goods to sell, and the object of their policy was not tribute but trade. This required direct rule, but not settlement, except in the ports. Finally, with the growth of capitalism and the opening of the Suez Canal, the typical system of colonial development was by foreign capital with European management and imported Asian labor. Thus there was a process of development from the old colonial system of foreign settlement without foreign rule to a new system of foreign rule without settlement.[13]

Impact of the Changing Trend of Trade with the West

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648 In the nineteenth century, the age-old means of communication between the different parts of Southeast Asia

13. Furnivall, op. cit.

7: Janlekha X-4,5 (1948-1953)1956 AO7 Central Thai
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648 were revolutionized by the techniques and aims of the West.
175 After 1850, European-owned steamships began the gradual
177 process of taking over the bulk of the inter-port trade
648 from native sailing boats and Chinese junks. The opening
439 of the Suez Canal in 1869 made possible the great modern
505 expansion of Western rule and trade, and thereby brought about the economic and social revolution which has created the Southeast Asia of today. The year 1870 is the real dividing-line between medieval and modern in the history of Southeast Asia.[14]

175 Whereas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, and eight-
177 eenth centuries the various European nations active in South-
433 east Asia had, on the whole, limited themselves to trading
439 and acquisition of high-priced nonbulky commodities, such
648 as spices, the economic policy of the nineteenth century called for large quantities of bulky goods, such as sugar, fibers, oil seeds, coffee, and copra. Since the peasantry of Southeast Asia, almost without exception, raised only subsistence crops and had only limited surplus, it became necessary for the colonial powers to increase agricultural production. This was done in two ways: through the application of pressure on the peasantry to produce for export, and through the development of large-scale plantation agriculture.[15] The shift of emphasis from trade to production

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14. Harrison, op. cit., p. 197.

15. Karl J. Pelzer, "The Resource Pattern of Southeast Asia," Southeast Asia in the World Today, ed. Phillips Talbot. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951, p. 109.

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thus set a new stage -- the development of the natural resources of the whole region.

This change-over from a subsistence economy to a commercial economy involved the large-scale expansion of traditional crops or the development of new commercial crops. It was stimulated by the introduction or expansion of a money economy, the flow of capital and the development of land and sea transport. It was supported by Western technology, methods of administration and systems of justice. This whole process greatly affected the traditional institution, upsetting the balance of a medieval world. The free, individualist spirit of Western rule and commerce cut at the roots of traditional social life, undermining the corporate strength of family and village. But the most serious direct threat of the new economic forces was to the peasant's ownership of land. Expanding economies, new money taxes and cheap imports meant better business than ever for the money lender. Many peasants became ruined by debt and lost their lands. Indebtedness and debt slavery were not new in Southeast Asia; the latter was fairly soon stamped out, but the former now became much more widespread than before, resulting in the creation of a landless proletariat.[16]

Characteristics of Current Southeast Asian Economy

In spite of all the differences among the countries of Southeast Asia in the natural environment, ethnic

16. Harrison, op. cit., p. 210.

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ANGLO-FRENCH RIVALRY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA

ITS HISTORICAL GEOGRAPHY AND DIPLOMATIC CLIMATE

John L. Christian

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AN apposite instance of the interdependence of geography and history is provided by the tense rivalry between Great Britain and France in Southeast Asia before 1910. This rivalry, which was essentially a problem in the historical geography and diplomatic climate of the times, had its origin in the astonishingly persistent belief that somewhere between the Bay of Bengal and the South China Sea would be found a short route to the wealth and trade of interior China, particularly Yunnan and Szechwan.

Contemporaries regarded it as axiomatic that a Sino-French or Siamese-French war over French aggressions in Indochina would result in an Anglo-French war. Indeed, twice (in 1893 and 1896) the two countries were on the verge of battle for control of the Menam and Mekong routes to Yunnan. But geography and malaria were against the diplomats. These routes never have come into use; and the area where Burma, French Indochina, and Thailand now march in a common frontier is today one of the least-known regions of all Asia.

Largely because of the existence of close ties between the two countries since the maturing of the Entente Cordiale of 1904, it is easy to forget that they were in acrimonious rivalry in Southeast Asia for decades, particularly from 1862 to 1904, when Britain kept careful watch over French activities from Oman and Afghanistan in the Middle East to New Caledonia and the New Hebrides in the South Seas. In this instance certain historicogeographical aspects of the problem are basically more important than the usual facets of diplomacy and politics.

Beginnings of French and British Interests

Historically, French interest in the lands east of Suez began with the organization of the French East India Company, in 1604, the dispatch of the first French ships to the Orient, in 1611, and the beginnings of the French Oriental establishments, in the middle of the century. As early as 1631 the French regarded Madagascar as of particular value because of its favorable location for extending their trade to Southeast Asia.[1] By 1663 French priests were acquainted with coastal Burma, Siam, and Cambodia and in that year made their first crossing of the Malay Peninsula, near modern Tenasserim, while

[1] The Cambridge History of India, Vol. 5, British India, 1497–1858, edited by H. H. Dodwell, London, 1929, p. 62.

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en route to Siam.[2] Shortly thereafter the French, hard pressed on the mainland of India, proposed that their headquarters be moved to the Pegu coast. The French naval expedition of six ships that reached the Bay of Bengal in 1690 had as its object the establishment of commerce with Burma and Siam. In fact, the failure of the trade of the British East India Company in Burma and Siam in the seventeenth century was traced to the superiority of French influence in those states.[3]

In the eighteenth century Dupleix was interested in Burma and Siam because of the abundance there of teakwood for shipbuilding, and he suggested to his superiors that they acquire a portion of the Burmese coast.[4] During Burma's internal strife that resulted in the establishment of the Alaungpaya dynasty in 1755, the French made the mistake of aiding the defeated Talaings, while the British aided the conquerors. As a result, Alaungpaya acquired a supply of French arms, including 1300 muskets and forty 24-pounders, together with 200 French gunners, with which Burma became the premier state in Southeast Asia. The French, meantime, evened the score by inciting the Burmese to destroy the British colony on Negrais Island.[5]

In the nineteenth century Britain sent to the native states of Southeast Asia numerous embassies that had as their primary or secondary purpose inquiry into the extent of French influence in these states. For example, the missions to Burma of Symes in 1795 and 1802 and of Canning in 1803 and 1809; that of Crawfurd in 1822 to Siam and in 1826 to Burma; that of Finlayson in 1821 and Crawfurd in 1830 to Cochinchina; and those of Captain Burney, Sir James Brooke, and Sir John Bowring to Siam in the first half of the century were all interested in British trade and French ambition.

The Indochinese Peninsula

Ever since the early merchant adventurers were forced to pass through the Strait of Malacca or the Sunda Strait to reach the China coast the great Indochinese peninsula has been of interest to Europeans, principally as an obstacle to a direct route to the Far East, as that term is generally understood. In the past century it became common knowledge among Europeans in the Orient that at one point, far above the head of navigation, the Yangtze flows within 600 miles of the northern reaches of the Bay of Bengal, whereas it is some 4300 miles by sea from Calcutta to Shanghai. It was only natural that

[2] Adrien Launay: Histoire générale de la Société des Missions-Étrangères, 3 vols., Paris, 1894; reference in Vol. 1, p. 74.

[3] D. G. E. Hall: Early English Intercourse with Burma (Rangoon Univ. Publs., No. 1), London, 1928, pp. 138–153.

[4] V. McL. Thompson: Dupleix and His Letters, New York, 1933, p. 721; and Alfred Martineau: Dupleix et l'Inde française, 1749–1754, Paris, 1927, p. 451.

[5] D. G. E. Hall: The Tragedy of Negrais, *Journ. Burma Research Soc.*, Vol. 21, 1931, pp. 1–133.

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

FIG. 1.

early cartographers and pioneers of commerce should assume that the most direct route to interior China would be along one of the great meridional rivers of the Indochinese peninsula to the Yangtze.[6] At one point, somewhat north of the present Burma Road, the Yangtze, Mekong, and Salween are compressed within a distance of 48 miles (separated by ridges reaching up to 8000 feet above the floor of the adjacent valley).[7] But the Irrawaddy, contrary to early beliefs, does not rise on the Tibetan plateau as do the other great meridional rivers[8]

[6] Bruno Hassenstein: Some Contributions to the Geographical and Cartographical Literature of the Indo-Chinese Frontier Territories, n. p., n. d., gives a useful list of the principal sources on the area before 1900. Reports of early British attempts to penetrate India's northeastern frontier are summarized in "Selections of Papers regarding the Hill Tracts between Assam and Burmah," 10 vols., Calcutta, 1873.

[7] For a photographic report see J. F. Rock: Through the Great River Trenches of Asia, *Natl. Geogr. Mag.*, Vol. 50, 1926, pp. 133–186.

[8] A fact first noted in Sir Henry Yule: A Narrative of the Mission Sent by the Governor-General of India to the Court of Ava in 1855, London, 1858, p. 272.

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and thus occupies a unique place among the rivers of Southeast Asia, as Professor L. Dudley Stamp has recently pointed out.[9]

Geographical and historical knowledge of the area within 300 miles of the point where the frontiers of Thailand, French Indochina, and Burma now meet was extremely sketchy until the beginning of the present century. For example, Dupuis, in his study of Tongking in 1872, prepared a map that showed the Burmese possessions reaching to the Black River, within 200 miles of Hanoi, into territory concerning which King Mindon and his successor, Theebaw, had only the slightest knowledge and no jurisdiction.[10] Dupuis was perhaps willing to show extensive Burmese territory in the hope that France would inherit Mindon's holdings; but the map was later to plague the French, who, after the British annexation of Burma, in 1886, found it to their advantage to maintain that Burma had at no time extended even to the Mekong.

Garnier's Expedition

In 1858 France seized Saigon; in 1862 the Court of Hué signed a treaty that surrendered Cochinchina to France; and in 1867 Siam was forced to recognize the French as overlords of Cambodia. As a result of the treaty with Annam, Francis Garnier was appointed Inspector of Native Affairs in the new protectorate, with permission to travel on the Mekong. On June 5, 1866, the De Lagree–Garnier expedition left Saigon in the first organized European exploration of the hinterland of Indochina from the China side.[11] On April 29, 1867, the party reached Luang Prabang, a place seldom visited by Europeans since the Dutch trader Gerard van Wusthof arrived there in 1641.[12] By June the party had reached the point where Burma, Thailand, and French Indochina now meet. Garnier noted there the sale of British cotton goods in the bazaar of Kiang Sen; and De Lagree reported that tribes on the left bank of the Mekong were loyal to Siam. Both explorers observed the presence of Burmese agents with authority at the principal crossings of the Mekong. On August 23, 1867, De Lagree visited Keng Tung, in what was undoubtedly Burmese territory; and thereafter the British in Lower Burma were ever watchful of French designs on territory bordering the upper Mekong. The Frenchmen passed on to Kiang Hung town, which has been under Chinese sovereignty since the Sino-British boundary settlements and

[9] The Irrawaddy River, *Geogr. Journ.*, Vol. 95, 1940, pp. 329–356 (see note elsewhere in this number of the *Geographical Review*).

[10] J. Dupuis: L'ouverture du Fleuve Rouge au commerce et les événements du Tong-Kin, 1872–73, Paris, 1879.

[11] Hugh Clifford: Further India, London, 1904, pp. 129–254, gives a vivid account of the Garnier expedition. The basic source is Francis Garnier: Voyage d'exploration en Indo-Chine effectué pendant les années 1866, 1867 et 1868 . . . , 2 vols. and atlas, Paris, 1873.

[12] Garnier seems to have been the first to make readily available a translation of Van Wusthof's diary. The translation, which was made for Garnier by M. P. Vœlkel, was printed, with Garnier's annotations, in the *Bulletin de la Société de Géographie*, Ser. 6, Vol. 2, 1871, pp. 249–289.

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treaties of 1894 and 1897, where they noted that both Burma and China had agents in the court. On March 2, 1868, the party left the Mekong, and they reached Talifu by a journey that took them directly across the route followed by British and Burmese trade to interior Yunnan. The Moslem Sultan of Tali ordered the Garnier party away from his territory. Garnier explained the action: The Sultan has mistaken us for Englishmen. After the death of De Lagree in Yunnan young Garnier took the party out by way of Hankow, whence they traveled on to Shanghai by the American steamer *Plymouth Rock*. The Garnier expedition touched the Mekong at no point above Kiang Hung, a city to which the Britisher Captain McLeod had preceded them by thirty years. McLeod made his remarkable journey from Moulmein to Kiang Hung with six elephants and was the first European to penetrate China by the Salween route for purposes of examining trade routes.

When once it had been reported[13] that Garnier intended to "strike the Irrawaddy at Bhamo" and that he was expected also at Keng Tung and Mandalay, British interest in French activities in Southeast Asia was keen. Major General Albert Fytche, Chief Commissioner of British Burma, proceeded to Mandalay and secured Mindon's signature to a treaty that compromised Burma's independence.[14] Extraterritoriality was secured (abandoned in 1879). British agents were permitted to sit in Burmese customhouses; and Burma's power to control commerce across her territory to China was further restricted. A Resident was authorized for Mandalay, and the Irrawaddy was opened for navigation by British steamers. Captain Strover was stationed as agent in Bhamo and traveled up in November, 1868, by the first British steamer to reach that river port 40 miles from the Chinese frontier.[15] He was not, however, provided with a gunboat, as had at first been suggested; nor did Britain assume control of Burma's foreign relations, as her officers in British Burma had urged.[16]

The Sladen and Browne Expeditions

After much patient work, General Fytche in 1868 obtained permission from the King of Burma and authorization from the government of India for the dispatch of an expedition from Bhamo to Tali. Colonel E. B. Sladen, Political Agent at Mandalay, set out[17] with a group of six Europeans and a guard of 50 sepoys toward the same

[13] The London *Times*, June 7, 1868.

[14] Albert Fytche: Burma, Past and Present, 2 vols. (in 1), London, 1878. See the Anglo-Burmese treaty of Oct. 25, 1867, in *British and Foreign State Papers, 1870–71*, pp. 61 and 1305–1308.

[15] J. G. Scott, assisted by J. P. Hardiman: Gazetteer of Upper Burma and the Shan States, 2 parts in 5 vols., Rangoon, 1900–1901; reference in Part I, Vol. 1, p. 64.

[16] Alexander Bowers: Bhamo Expedition: A Report on the Practicability of Re-opening the Trade Route between Burma and Western China, Rangoon, 1869, p. 100.

[17] The official account is E. B. Sladen: Narrative of the Expedition to Explore the Trade Routes to China via Bhamo, Rangoon, 1869.

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goal as the Garnier party that had left Saigon two years before. The Sladen party reached Momein (modern Tengyueh) in September, 1868, three months after Garnier's return to Saigon. Colonel Sladen could get no farther than Tengyueh, however, because of the disturbed state of the country as a result of the Panthay rebellion.[18]

Eventually Lord Salisbury yielded to the fears of British commercial interests that the French would entirely absorb the markets of Yunnan and neighboring provinces and sent an expedition to reopen British trade routes (1875). Colonel Horace Browne, accompanied by the geographer Ney Elias, who is remembered for his journey through Mongolia and his survey of the Yellow River, succeeded in getting farther than Manwyne, to Serai, where they learned that Augustus Margary, who had gone on ahead, had been murdered (1875).[19] Browne's party thereupon returned to Bhamo as the last official British attempt to open a direct route to interior China. As a matter of fact, the reports of Grosvenor, Baber, and Davenport, who were sent from Hankow to Yunnan in connection with the British demand for reparation over the Margary affair, convinced the home government that the topographic difficulties of the route from Bhamo to Yunnan and Szechwan were too great for practical railway construction.[20]

Government of India's Lack of Interest

British officials in Burma frequently complained of the impossibility of getting the government of India to give any attention to the northeastern frontier. That government was wholly occupied with the northwestern frontier and the danger of Russian aggression through Afghanistan and the Khyber Pass. As early as the Anglo-Nepalese war of 1816–1818 Dr. Francis Buchanan, of laterite fame,[21] had advised the East India Company against "giving the Chinese any just reason for suspicion by forming pretensions to any part of the mountainous region which separates the two Empires."[22] Lord Lawrence, the Viceroy, had advised against the Sladen expedition: "His Excellency can hardly conceive any step more imprudent than for British merchants to settle in Bhamo or a British official to be stationed there for any purpose."[23] In the short viceroyalty of Lord

[18] This disturbance hindered the British and aided the French. Captain Strover reported that during his first three years in Bhamo "not a single consignment belonging to British firms had reached Bhamo."

[19] The resultant British demand for compensation gave rise to the famed Chefoo Convention, a recent study of which is S. T. Wang: The Margary Affair and the Chefoo Agreement, New York, 1940.

[20] Particularly E. Colborne Baber: Travels and Researches in the Interior of China, *Royal Geogr. Soc. Suppl. Papers*, Vol. 1, 1882–1885, pp. 1–201, especially pp. 154–192, "Notes on the Route Followed by Mr. Grosvenor's Mission through Western Yünnan," reprinted from *Parliamentary Rept., China, No. 3 (1878)*.

[21] See this number of the *Geographical Review*, p. 177.

[22] Papers respecting the Nepaul War, London, 1824, p. 45.

[23] Letter from the government of India to Fytche, dated Simla, July 18, 1867, in Sladen, *op. cit.*, appendix T.

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Mayo the government of India, even at the risk of losing control over the trade routes to Yunnan, again stated its policy:[24] "The future annexation of Burma, or any of its adjacent states, is not an event which I . . . desire; . . . I should view with extreme regret . . . the necessity of occupation, or of assuming, even in a temporary manner, the government of any of the states lying adjacent to the province now in your charge." In short, the official attitude of the government of India has been summarized as follows: "The condition of the Northeastern frontier caused no Governor-General a single sleepless night."[25]

Railways Suggested

Meantime, British commercial interests continued to demand that the Indian government provide facilities for trade to western China in order to forestall any French plans to acquire prior advantages in Yunnan and Szechwan. The *Parliamentary Papers* alone contain nearly twenty reports on expeditions and proposals with respect to trans-Burma trade with western China and the upper Mekong from 1824 to 1900. The most persistent advocates of British penetration of Yunnan, Szechwan, and Kwangsi from the Bay of Bengal were Captain Richard Sprye and his son, who for half a century (1840–1890) presented numerous proposals for railways and highways into western Siam, to the Shan and Laos States, and to southern China.

Perhaps the best-publicized effort was that by Archibald R. Colquhoun, a deputy commissioner in British Burma, and Holt S. Hallett, a civil engineer. Colquhoun, who was ardently anti-French, resigned his office when the government of Burma refused him leave to survey a railway route from Moulmein to Szemao by way of Chiengmai in Siam. He became a special correspondent for the London *Times*, traveled overland from Canton to Bhamo, and wrote voluminously against French designs on Southeast Asia.[26] The Colquhoun-Hallett railway plan suffered from a general suspicion that it was merely a means for "taking the King of Siam by the hand and leading him into the great British Indian family."[27] Although Colquhoun's line is actually the shortest practicable route from the Bay of Bengal to Yunnanfu (Kunming), it passes through sparsely settled country that is everywhere malarial below 4000 feet. There is not today a railway line, caravan route, or highway, British or French or Siamese, that anywhere follows the Colquhoun-Hallett survey.

[24] Fytche, *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, pp. 124–125 (letter from Lord Mayo).

[25] D. G. E. Hall, edit.: The Dalhousie-Phayre Correspondence, 1852–1856, London, 1932, p. xv.

[26] A. R. Colquhoun: Across Chrysê, 2 vols., 2nd edit., London, 1883; A. R. Colquhoun and H. S. Hallett: Report on the Railway Connexion of Burmah and China, London, 1887. See also H. S. Hallett: A Thousand Miles on an Elephant in the Shan States, Edinburgh and London, 1890.

[27] Philippe Lehault: France et Angleterre en Asie, Paris, 1892, p. 562.

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British Annexation of Upper Burma

French intrigue in Upper Burma, with its consequent danger to British commercial interests, was the principal reason for the annexation of independent Burma, in 1886.[28] Jules Ferry had pledged repeatedly that no French arms should be supplied Burma through Tongking. But British suspicions were aroused upon the discovery that a Franco-Burmese agreement had been signed providing for the construction of a railway, the establishment of a Bank of Burma with French capital, control of the Burmese postal system, and establishment of a line of French steamers on the Irrawaddy.[29] The die was cast when the British learned of a secret agreement to supply arms from Tongking after the signing of the Franco-Burmese treaty of January 15, 1885.[30]

The Viceroy, Lord Dufferin, sent a message to the senior official in Lower Burma: "If, however, the present proceedings should eventuate in any serious attempt [by the French] to forestall us in Upper Burma I should not hesitate to annex the country."[31] After the publication of a "remarkably indiscreet" report by M. de Lanessan on the progress of French activities in Burma,[32] the Secretary of State on November 11, 1886, wired the Viceroy: "Please instruct General Prendergast to advance on Mandalay at once."[33]

British occupation of Upper Burma was followed by expeditions into the various Shan States tributary to King Theebaw. In 1890 a British party under Sir George Scott reached Keng Tung. Meantime both the French and the Siamese had asserted claims to parts of the former Burmese possessions. During the Franco-Burmese negotiations of 1885 Burma purported to cede part of Kiang Hung across the Mekong to the French. The British, as heirs to Theebaw's dominions, claimed the area but later awarded Kiang Hung to China on condition that it should never be ceded to another power.[34] However, the Chinese almost immediately gave part of Kiang Hung to the French.

Further difficulty arose over the substate of Mong Hsing, a trans-Mekong territory ruled by a junior branch of the governing family of Keng Tung. In March, 1894, Mr. Stirling of the Burma

[28] The British were fully aware of Burmese and French plans, which were reported in detail to the government of India. The Blue Book "Correspondence Relating to Burmah since the Accession of King Theebaw, in October, 1878," has 266 pages of dispatches, C. 4614 in *Parliamentary Papers*, 1886.

[29] Comte A. Mahé de la Bourdonnais: Un français en Birmanie, Paris, 1891. pp. 295–306.

[30] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*, footnote 28), No. 105.

[31] Sir Alfred Lyall: Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava, 2 vols., London, 1905; reference in Vol. 2, p. 118.

[32] J. L. de Lanessan: Rapport fait au nom de la commission chargée d'examiner le projet de loi portant approbation de la convention complémentaire de commerce, signée à Paris le 15 janvier 1885, entre la France et la Birmanie, Paris, 1885. Lanessan became an aggressive governor general of French Indochina (1891 to 1894).

[33] C. 4614 (*op. cit.*), No. 122.

[34] Sir Edward Hertslet: Hertslet's China Treaties, 3rd edit., revised by G. E. P. Hertslet, with the assistance of Edward Parkes, 2 vols., London, 1908; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 90–109.

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Commission visited Mong Hsing; and he was followed, on Christmas Day, 1894, by Sir George Scott and Mr. Wharry, Chinese Political Adviser to the government of Burma, in connection with the Anglo-French Mekong Commission. M. Pavie, the French commissioner, had sent the French flag to Mong Hsing before the arrival of the British party, and the sawbwa had hoisted the tricolor over his palace. Pavie, who reached Mong Hsing on New Year's Day, had intended to welcome Sir George Scott to French territory. However, Scott had the French flag lowered and ran up his own. For a few months the incident had all the possibilities of an Oriental Fashoda nearly five years before the famous incident on the Nile.[35] The London *Times* had columns about the Mong Hsing incident; and Pavie in private conversation with Scott doubted the validity of French claims to the bazaar town. On January 15, 1895, a telegraphic message from the Viceroy announced an agreement with France that set mid-channel of the Mekong as the boundary.[36] Thus Mong Hsing, which had flown the British flag and had had a British post office for a year, was acquired by France. Siam's claims were quieted by the Treaty of Chantabun, which transferred all Siamese rights east of the Mekong to France. The remainder of the subordinate state of Keng Cheng went first to Siam but was acquired by France in May, 1896. British interests with respect to the Mekong frontier suffered from frequent changes of policy: Lord Roseberry favored the buffer-state idea;[37] Lord Kimberley ordered the occupation of Mong Hsing; then Lord Salisbury, "without exception the worst Foreign Secretary we ever had for matters east of Suez,"[38] gave up the state to France. The French secured a strategic, natural frontier for their Indochinese holdings and had the "further gratification of having enlarged them beyond all expectation."[39]

Later Rivalries

Anglo-French rivalry continued in Yunnan along Burma's northern frontiers until well into the present century. Rival railway and mining claims were the most frequent causes of friction. Article XII of the Anglo-Chinese agreement of February 4, 1897, contemplated

[35] The Mong Hsing–Keng Cheng incident is treated definitively by Clarence Hendershot: The Conquest, Pacification, and Administration of the Shan States by the British, 1886–1897 (Diss., Ph.D., University of Chicago, 1936). The best French account is contained in "Mission [Auguste] Pavie Indo-Chine, 1879–1895: Géographie et Voyages," Vol. 5, Paris, 1902, pp. 264–284.

[36] "Livre Jaune: Affairs du Haute-Mekong et de Siam, 1893–1902." By Article IV of the declaration, the two governments agreed that all commercial and other advantages conceded in the two Chinese provinces of Yunnan and Szechwan either to France or to Great Britain by their respective conventions of March 2, 1894, and June 20, 1895, and future privileges should "be extended and rendered common to both powers."

[37] G. L. LaFuze: Great Britain, France, and the Siamese Question, 1885–1904 (Diss., Ph.D., Univ. of Illinois, 1935), discusses the various proposals for a buffer state.

[38] G. E. Mitton [Lady Scott], edit.: Scott of the Shan Hills, London, 1936, p. 166.

[39] *Ibid.*, p. 215.

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railway construction in Yunnan and provided for connection with Burmese lines.[40] No development, however, took place and the British abandoned their surveys beyond Bhamo and Lashio. The agreement between France and China of April 10, 1898, authorized the French to construct a railway from the Tongking frontier to Yunnanfu.[41] This was carried out, but the plans for carrying the line farther were discarded. Activities of French explorers and missionaries in Yunnan along the Burma frontier were watched closely; the British in Burma were only mildly enthusiastic about the explorations of Prince Henry of Orleans from the Mekong to Assam across the top of Burma in 1895. The British were careful to open consulates in Szemao (Es-mok) and other inland treaty ports of Yunnan and Kwangsi that had little trans-Burma trade.

Siam probably owed her independence to the desire of both her neighbors to have a buffer state between them, the British having decided that Burma was "too soft and pulpy" to serve in that capacity. As matters turned out, France got much the lion's share of territory shorn from Siam. There is not in Burma today any area that was for any length of time Siamese territory, a fact recognized by the present Thai minister to the United States, who issued a communiqué indicating that, in contrast with her present demands upon the French possessions, Thailand is entirely satisfied with her Burma frontier.[42]

British development of Singapore after 1819, introduction of steam navigation to the Orient, the opening of the Suez Canal and the American transcontinental railway in 1869 only heightened the rivalry for alternate short cuts to "the greatest market in the world." By 1882 French engineers had completed surveys of a proposed Kra canal; and on June 8, 1883, Ferdinand de Lesseps presented the completed plans to the King of Siam as "la route Français au Tonkin." That distinguished Frenchman spoke of Bangkok as "the beginning of the Menam route to Yunnan."[43]

By about 1910 the epic age of European imperialism had come to an end; and since that time there have been no considerable additions to the French and British empires east of the Red Sea. Yunnan and Kweichow, for which the rivalry was particularly acute, during the past decade were perhaps less subject to foreign influence than any other provinces of China proper. Lord Curzon (Viceroy of

[40] J. V. A. MacMurray, edit.: Treaties and Agreements with and concerning China 1894–1919 (Publs. Carnegie Endowment for Internatl. Peace, Division of Internatl. Law, Washington), 2 vols., New York, 1921; reference in Vol. 1, pp. 96–97.

[41] *Ibid.*, Vol. 1, p. 124.

[42] *The New York Times*, Oct. 6, 1940. Britain took compensation in the Malay states of Kelantan, Trengganu, Kedah, and Perak, which had been under loose Siamese protection before their cession to Britain in 1909.

[43] La Bourdonnais, *op. cit.*, pp. 232–241 and 963–284, discusses French interest in a Kra canal and contains a copy of De Lesseps' report.

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India from 1898 to 1905), for whom frontiers and imperialism in the grand manner had great fascination, forced the Iman of Muscat to renounce the lease of a coaling site to France,[44] saw the Hague Court decide in Britain's favor in 1905 the question of the grant of the French flag to Muscat dhows, carried on an intimate correspondence with King Chualalongkorn of Siam, and considered that country an outpost of the British Empire.[45] From the Olympian heights of Simla Lord Curzon took pride in Britannia's supremacy in Southeast Asia. The Indian Ocean was a British preserve: "At no point in the long stretches of British territory washed by its surf has the flag of any European rival ever been hoisted since the French colours were struck over Cuddalore in 1783."[46] Curzon dreamed of a grand trunk railway from Calais to Shanghai by way of British India and sent Major Davies to do the necessary survey work in Yunnan.[47] He believed mistakenly that India and China, the two most populous countries in the world, would in his time be joined by steel rails.

The great delusion that the Irrawaddy, the Salween, the Menam, or the Mekong would provide the entrepôt to interior China was the key to Anglo-French policy and rivalry in Southeast Asia for a century. The delusion died hard. Eventually, however, "loath as most Englishmen are to admit it," trade decided that none of these river valleys provided an economical entrance to China.[48] Likewise, it was at length realized that Indochina was not the path of empire. Both Britishers and Frenchmen, learning lessons from geography and history, agreed with Sir Henry Yule: At no time has a conqueror from India or Burma passed on to China, nor (with one minor exception) from China to India or Burma; nor did the conquests of any one of the great warriors of medieval Asia embrace any part of both countries.[49]

But the delusion was so persistent and complete that it amounted to a perfect case of mistaken identity. Meantime, "England annexed areas where she had interests to protect, France annexed areas where she *wished* to have interests to protect."[50]

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[44] Lovat Fraser: India under Curzon and After, New York, 1911, pp. 86–91, gives a convenient summary of French attempts to secure a base at the mouth of the Persian Gulf.

[45] Curzon wrote a brilliant defense of Britain's record in Siam (G. N. Curzon: The Siamese Boundary Question, *The Nineteenth Century*, Vol. 34, 1893, pp. 34–55).

[46] G. A. Ballard: Rulers of the Indian Ocean, London, 1927, p. 287.

[47] H. R. Davies: Yün-nan: The Link between India and the Yangtze, Cambridge, 1909. Davies urged construction, for political reasons, of a meter-gauge line from Burma to China at a cost of £30,000,000.

[48] Clifford (quoting Colborne Baber), *op. cit.*, p. 294. A governor general of French Indochina came to the same conclusion. "French Indochina cannot be considered as a country of commercial transit. Saigon can never compete with Singapore" (J. L. de Lanessan: L'Indo-Chine Française, Paris, 1889, p. 478).

[49] Yule's introduction to William Gill: The River of Golden Sand, 2 vols., London, 1880

[50] E. V. G. Kiernan: British Diplomacy in China, 1880–1885, London, 1939, p. 182.

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178 caused or hastened a flight to the relative security of the city. These forces have been 162 operating in combination particularly in 369 Rangoon, Jakarta, Saigon, and Manila and largely are responsible for their extremely 361 rapid postwar growth. Lesser cities in Java, for example, such as Surabaya, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surakarta, also have increased in population because of rural insecurity; and in Burma in several towns and cities up to 50 per cent of the population has been resident less than four years, for the same reasons. These migrations have not, however, necessarily been accompanied by greater employment opportunities and consequently cannot be regarded as indexes of more rapid urbanization and associated socioeconomic change.

184 The great cities of Southeast Asia possess many features in common, not the least of 361 which is their youth. This quality they share also with several of the great cities of the 369 United States, but there the resemblance ceases.[11] In 1800 Rangoon, Saigon, and 175 Singapore did not yet exist in city form; 178 Bangkok, the new capital of Thailand, was less than twenty years old; Manila and Batavia (Jakarta), though then about two hundred years old, were merely small coastal towns. They began to grow rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, as a consequence of the development of the treaty ports in China, the opening of Japan, the transfer of power from the East India Company to the British Crown by the Queen's Proclamation of 1858, the opening of the

[11] For the most part the growth of the Southeast Asian cities was not associated with a total transformation of society but with a strong indigenous tradition, as in the case of Bangkok, or with the juxtaposition of a segment of a new civilization alongside the old, as in the case of Rangoon. In America the cities represented the culmination of a social transformation in a virtually unoccupied frontier region. The same is true of Manchuria, the northeastern frontier of pioneer settlement in China, which is more recently, and more highly, urbanized than any other part of China. In Manchuria, as in the United States, there is a quite regular gradation of city sizes, and the Primate City cannot be clearly identified.

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Suez Canal in 1869, and the consolidation of Western control, direct or indirect, over most of Southeast Asia in the 1890's, followed by American acquisition of the Philippines at the turn of the century.

More important, the great cities were, and to a large degree still are, foreign creations, essentially alien to the Southeast Asian landscape. Although several began as native settlements, they developed as foreign exclaves on the margins of Asia, in much the same way as did the plantation system and mining operations. With the exception of Bangkok, they represented and functioned as the overseas appendages of Western, not indigenous, interests, being what Spate has called "head-links"—the gates by which Western concepts entered to destroy and build and in which a new system of economic organization evolved.[13] Indeed, the concept of the Asian plural society was inspired by the contrast between the basically foreign great city and the indigenous agricultural village. The ties of the great city with its hinterland were primarily commercial and associated with foreign-controlled mining and plantation interests and with Chinese-dominated rice trade. Such direct political-administrative ties as did exist were restricted primarily to indigenous elites, small in number, which allied themselves with Western interests. Where the indigenous rural populations were affected by these urban-rural relations, it was primarily through the plantation or the mining system, both of which needed a large labor force, or through Indian or Chinese intermediaries.

On the other hand, the relations between an indigenous capital, like Bangkok in its earlier period, or Kyoto or Peking, and the agrarian society upon which it was based were of quite a different order. In these cases the capital represented the culmination of what might be termed a national *ethos*, the epitome of what Redfield has

[13] O. H. K. Spate, "Factors in the Development of Capital Cities," *Geographical Review*, October, 1942, p. 628.

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504 world's great ports and the most Western of
361 the great cities of Southeast Asia. A Crown Colony, it is the only great city without a large administrative hinterland, although it is the seat of the British High Commissioner
● [175] for Southeast Asia. Since its founding by Raffles in 1819, it has been a free port and an entrepôt for much of archipelagic Southeast Asia. About half of the 5.5 million tons of cargo that pass over Singapore's modern wharves originates outside of the Malayan peninsula, and it was not until 1924 that the island of Singapore was connected by causeway with the mainland. At the same time it handles two-thirds of Malaya's exports and about three-fourths of its imports by value. Increasingly, its interests have tended to focus upon Malaya itself, as its entrepôt functions have been cut into by the other great ports within the region, especially Jakarta. What has kept Singapore the largest port in Southeast Asia (over 20 million net tons of shipping entered in 1952) is its status as a free port and its strategic location at the western entrance to the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean basin. As a crossroad between the Pacific and Indian oceans, it attracts shipping from great distances. It
[508] also has become an important air center, and a new airfield is under construction north-
[368] east of the city. Finally, the concentration of banking, insurance, light industry, docking, repair, and outfitting facilities have fortified its dominant position.

361 Singapore City was originally laid out with due regard for ethnic quarters.[18] The
563 oldest section of the city, however, has become the business center, but the rest of the older town is a densely populated Chinese section, and much of the newer town to the northeast also is Chinese. Each of these areas is in turn divided on the basis of Chinese clan categories. The European residen-

[18] D. F. Allen, *Report on the Major Ports of Malaya* (Kuala Lumpur: Government Printer, 1951), p. 128.

[19] For a general description of the city see E. H. G. Dobby, "Singapore: Town and Country," *Geographical Review*, January, 1940, and the *Colony of Singapore Annual Report*.

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tial area is primarily on higher ground in the northern part of the city. The University of Malaya is located in Singapore, though plans are being made to move it to Johore Baru on the Malayan mainland. Being largely a Chinese city, Singapore has come to act as a center for the Nan Yang expatriate Chinese, and the city has been chosen as the site of a new Chinese-language regional university.[20] Nevertheless, its air is not that of a Chinese city, nor, for that matter, is it English. Like all great cities, it is cosmopolitan, but it is also culturally rootless, perhaps more so than any of the other great cities of the region.

At the other extreme is Bangkok, most indigenous of the great cities. Founded as the last of a series of "forward capitals"[21] by the Thai in 1783, after the destruction of Ayuthia by the Burmese, the city has never lost its native quality. The soaring rooftrees of *bot* and the spires of stupa stamp the Bangkok skyline with a character of its own. The city is located on the left bank of the Menam Chao Phya within the southernmost great bend of the river some twenty miles from its mouth. Exceptional problems of poor drainage plagued the city from the start, and its numerous *klongs* or canals have given it the rather misleading title of the "Venice of the East."

A Chinese city early appeared to the southeast of the original castle town and in time became part of the central business district. As the lesser *klongs* were filled in to become roads, the city continued to expand. A new city appeared on the northern outskirts of the old, a planned creation built in the reign of Rama VI with broad boulevards and buildings ranging from shocking Victorian variations on Italian Renaissance to more recent battleship modern. The contrast between the façade of modern buildings fronting these boulevards and the stilted, bamboo, thatch, and tin-roofed houses

[20] Richard Butwell, "A Chinese University for Malaya," *Pacific Affairs*, December, 1953.

[21] See reference to Cornish in Spate, *op. cit.*, p. 624.

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Bang Kok

361 behind them is one of the most striking
34 demonstrations of cultural dualism in South-
184 east Asia.

Unlike the other great cities, Bangkok
● 175 originated as the capital of a land-oriented
361 agrarian state. Its proximity to tidewater
504 was accidental. In 1822 the ship bearing the
177 Crawfurd mission to the Thai court barely
was able to cross the bar at the mouth of the
Menam, then covered by only four feet of
178 water.[22] Its poor harbor and its remoteness
from the major shipping routes of the South
China Sea conspired to retard the develop-
ment of the city as a port until the end of the
nineteenth century and to retain it as an
anachronism in Southeast Asia—a growing
city, nearly great, surely primate, but indig-
enous rather than Western. Nevertheless,
since it was through Bangkok that Western
influences filtered into Thailand, it is a case
of an indigenous capital acting as a revolu-
tionary medium for socioeconomic change.

504 Bangkok is still the least convenient port
of the great cities in Southeast Asia. The bar
361 across the mouth of the Chao Phya was
dredged through only in 1952, and port
facilities are modest as compared with the
other cities. Indeed, most vessels still anchor
in the Bight of Bangkok in the lee of the
island, Kao Hsi Kang, at the mouth of the
Chao Phya and transship their cargoes to
and from river barges and country boats
which link the island with Bangkok. Sur-
prisingly, the freight tonnage handled at
Bangkok is about one-third that of Singa-
pore, although the volume of shipping is
only one-tenth as large. The explanation lies
partly in the large bulk shipments of rice
which form the main export. Partly, also,
there is a lower load factor at Singapore,
since much of the shipping which enters its
harbor is as much dependent on the local
complex of service facilities as on cargo po-
tential. At Bangkok, peripheral as it is to the
main trade routes, few vessels call without
assurances of sizable cargoes.

[22] See J. Crawfurd, *Journal of an Embassy from the Governor-General of India to the Courts of Siam and Cochin China* (London: H. Colburn & R. Bentley, 1830).